Northern Illinois University Law Review
Volume 29

Issue 3

Article 5

7-1-2009

The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in the Family Court: An
Exemplar of Disharmony Between Social Policy Goals,
Professional Ethics, and the Current State of the Law
Deborah Paruch

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/niulr
Part of the Law Commons

Suggested Citation
Deborah Paruch, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in the Family Court: An Exemplar of Disharmony
Between Social Policy Goals, Professional Ethics, and the Current State of the Law, 29 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 499
(2009).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Huskie Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Northern Illinois University Law Review by an authorized editor of Huskie Commons. For
more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in the
Family Court: An Exemplar of Disharmony
Between Social Policy Goals, Professional
Ethics, and the Current State of the Law
DEBORAH PARUCH*
1.
II.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 499
THE HISTORY OF PRIVILEGES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE .......................................... 501
A.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSION AND THE
DEVELOPMENT
OF
THE
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE .................................................................................. 505

III. THE EMPIRICAL STUDIES: SUPPORT FOR THE PSYCHOTHERAPISTPATIENT PRIVILEGE ..........................................................................
A.
THE SHUMAN AND WEINER STUDIES ..........................................
B.
THE EVANS-MARSH STUDY ........................................................
C. THE TAUBE AND ELWORK STUDY ..............................................

D.

521
522
526
528

OTHER EMPIRICAL STUDIES ....................................................... 529

IV. EXCEPTIONS TO THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE
USE
OF
THERAPIST
TESTIMONY
IN
SELECTING
JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS ................................................................................... 532
A.
EXCEPTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS ...................................... 532
B.
EXCEPTIONS IN THE STATE COURTS ........................................... 536
C.
EXCEPTIONS IN CHILD CUSTODY CASES .................................... 537
D.
EXCEPTIONS IN CHILD PROTECTION PROCEEDINGS ................... 544
E.
THE NATURE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE IN TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS PROCEEDINGS .............................................. 548
V. CRITICISMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................. 560
V I. C ONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 569

I.

INTRODUCTION

As asepsis is to surgery, so is confidentiality to psychiatry.

*
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law. The
author would like to express her gratitude to her research assistants, Sarah Tuipca, Aaron
Imbler, and James Gallagher, for their invaluable contributions to this article.
1. Jerome S. Beigler, Tarasoff v. Confidentiality, 2 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 273 (1984).
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All of the mental health professions believe in the importance of confidentiality in the psycho-therapeutic relationship and the concomitant effect that this confidentiality has on the effectiveness of treatment. To this
end, the professional ethical standards of the various mental health professions require that therapists and counselors protect confidential information
obtained in the course of treatment. A psychotherapist-patient testimonial
privilege prohibits the compulsory disclosure of confidential psychotherapist information in legal actions and is recognized by the common law in
the federal courts and by statutes in each of the fifty states. However, in the
states, the statutory schemes provide uncertain protection of this confidential information in child custody disputes and virtually no protection in
child abuse and neglect cases. Additionally, although courts are exercising
greater control and demanding greater accountability over expert testimony,
this is not the case in child custody actions where the best interest of the
child standard is employed. In disputed child custody cases and child protection proceedings, mental health professionals are frequently asked to
provide the court with information, recommendations, and opinions on the
ultimate issue in the case. These professionals are often asked to report the
results of a court-ordered evaluation, but courts regularly call treating
therapists to testify against their patients' interests and require them to reveal confidential information obtained in psychotherapy sessions.
The abrogation of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is widely believed to be necessary for the protection of the children involved in family
court proceedings. This article challenges this assumption and examines
whether the evidence obtained in this manner is reliable, meaningful, and
truly necessary for a proper adjudication of these cases such that it actually
serves to foster the important public policy goal of protecting our children.
It evaluates the conflict between the need for confidentiality in the therapist-patient relationship and the need to protect children in a way that more
accurately reflects the true interests at stake. This article demonstrates that
the wholesale abrogation of these privileges carries a significant cost in that
it drastically reduces the likelihood of a successful therapeutic encounter. It
also demonstrates that the interest in the protection of children is not significantly furthered since the evidentiary benefit resulting from the abrogation of the privilege is slight.
Part II of this article begins with a discussion of the development of
privileges in general and follows with a discussion of the development of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege. This section presents the U.S. Supreme Court's 1997 decision in Jaffee v. Redmond, in which the Court recognized this privilege in the federal courts. Part II presents the results of
empirical studies that have been conducted during the last twenty years by
social scientists who have sought to assess the effect of confidentiality on
the therapeutic relationship. Overall, these studies demonstrate that the lack
of confidentiality unequivocally affects patients' willingness to disclose
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sensitive information which, in turn, directly impacts the outcome of therapy.
Part IV focuses on the exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. It surveys the development and present status of the exceptions that
have been recognized by the federal and state courts. It focuses on the abrogation of the privilege in contested child custody actions and child protection proceedings. It includes a review of a sample of opinions from the
Michigan Court of Appeals arising from parental rights termination cases in
which a therapist's testimony was cited by the court as a factor in its decision. These cases demonstrate the slight value of this evidence since the
treating therapists' compelled testimony was not necessary for a proper
adjudication of any of the cases. Part V presents criticisms of the present
legal framework and offers suggestions for alternatives to the existing policies and procedures.

II.

THE HISTORY OF PRIVILEGES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

Privileges are a unique aspect of the law of evidence in that unlike
other rules of evidence that are designed to improve the reliability of the
fact-finding process, the rules governing the scope and effect of privileges
operate to impede the search for truth by excluding highly probative evidence. 2 Privileges are justified by the need to protect the privacy of certain
relationships and the need to encourage open communications within these
relationships. The most common privileges include an individual's right to
be free from compelled self-incrimination and the privileges that protect
confidential communications between spouses, attorneys and their clients,
and physicians and their patients.4 These privilege rules protect against the
forced disclosure on the witness stand of statements and communications at
the option of the witness, client, penitent, patient, or spouse.5
The law of privileges has developed from several sources. Some privileges are provided for in the Constitution, such as the privilege against selfincrimination. In the states, privileges are generally statutory, whereas the
federal law of privileges originates from the common law. 6 One of the earliest privileges to be recognized was the Roman law rule that refused to
compel an attorney to testify against his client during the pendency of a
2. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER
(3d ed. 2003).
3. Id.
4.
KENNETH S. BROtUN ET AL.,

& LAIRD

C.

KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE

MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE

§ 72, at

§ 5.1, at 285

114-15 (John W.

Strong ed., 5th ed. 2006).
5.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1078 (Henry Campbell Black ed., 5th ed. 1979).
6. PAUL C. GIANNELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE 566 (2d ed. 2006).
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case. 7 Additional privileges came into existence during the early Middle
Ages, beginning with recognition of the priest-penitent privilege. This
privilege, which had its origin in the Seal of Confession and Canon law,
prohibited priests from revealing confessional confidences. 8 Saint Thomas
asserted that "the priest should conform himself to God, of whom he is the
minister, and as God does not reveal the sins 9made known to him in confession, so the priest should be equally reticent."

7.
Daniel W. Shuman, The Origins of the Physician-PatientPrivilege and Professional Secret, 39 Sw. L.J. 661, 667 (1985). This early attorney-client privilege was subsequently extended to disallow testimony by an attorney on behalf of a client. Id. While the
initial privilege seems to be based on the attorney's role as a servant of the client and likely
arose from the rule that prohibited a slave from testifying against a master, the subsequent
rule appears to be based on a relational privilege. Id. The author suggests that the rationale
for this privilege is deontological: to require a person to divulge a secret is itself a breach of
a moral duty and, therefore, wrong. Id.
8.
Id. at 668. Confessions were initially public affairs and took place in front of the
entire congregation. Id. However, they became private sometime during the fifth century.
Shuman, supra note 7, at 668. The Seal of Confession existed to prevent the risk of prosecution or personal humiliation that might deter confessions. Id. Canon law, the exclusive law
governing disputes between members of the Christian Church, prohibited a priest from revealing confidential information received in the confessional. Id.
9.
Id. at 668 n.29 (citing HENRY CHARLES LEA, A HISTORY OF AURICULAR
CONFESSION AND INDULGENCES IN THE LATIN CHURCH 415 (1896)). Priests could be dismissed for revealing confessional confidences, and in certain circumstances, greater sanctions were imposed. Id. at 669. What some believe to be the first reported instance of the
exclusionary rule occurred at Toulouse in 1579. Id. at 668-69. An innkeeper murdered a
guest and buried his body in his cellar. Shuman, supra note 7, at 668-69. The innkeeper
confessed the crime to a priest who, enticed by a reward, reported the crime to the magistrates. Id. The murderer confessed but reported that no one other than the priest could have
betrayed him. Id. Following an investigation, the Parlement of Toulouse released the criminal and hung the priest. l&.
Many contemporary scholars believe that that common law of England did not
recognize the priest-penitent privilege. Id at 670 n.40 (citing Edward A. Hogan, A Modern
Problem on the Privilege of the Confessional, 6 LoY. L. REV. 1, 1-2, 13 (1951)). Prior to
Henry VIII, the law of England and the law of the Roman Catholic Church were intertwined.
Id. (citing Edward A. Hogan, A Modem Problem on the Privilege of the Confessional, 6
LoY. L. REV. 1, 8 (1951)). During this period, the Seal of Confession effectively served as a
priest-penitent privilege. Shuman, supra note 7, at 670 n.40 (citing Edward A. Hogan, A
Modern Problem on the Privilege of the Confessional,6 LOY. L. REV. 1, 8 (1951)). However,
after Henry VII's break with the church, English courts rejected the privilege. Id. (citing
Edward A. Hogan, A Modern Problem on the Privilege of the Confessional, 6 LOY. L. REV.
1, 2, 13 (1951)). The first U.S. case to recognize this privilege was People v. Phillips, decided by a New York court in 1813. Karen L. Ross, Revealing Confidential Secrets: Will It
Save Our Children, 28 SETON HALL L. REV.963,977 (1998). In 1828, New York became the
first state to enact a clergy-communicant privilege statute. Id. at 975-76. Although all fifty
states recognize some form of clergy-communicant privilege, it is not absolute. Id. at 976.
Most but not all of the states require a member of the clergy report incidents of child abuse.
Id. at 977.
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The first privilege recognized under the common law of England was
the attorney-client privilege, initially recognized during the reign of Elizabeth 1.10 The rationale for this privilege is thought to have been a "'point of
honor,"' that gentlemen should not reveal confidences entrusted to them."
These early privileges are grounded in deontology, 12 the school of ethics
that maintains that acts are wrong or right in and of themselves simply because of the types of acts they are and not because of the consequences of
the action.' 3 The deontological approach to privileges focuses on the importance of the societal values encompassed in the privilege and recognizes
that disclosure of certain confidences is in and of itself wrong. 14 According
to Professor David Louisell, privileges are "primarily ...

a right to be let

alone, a right to unfettered freedom, in certain narrowly prescribed relationships, from the state's coercive or supervisory powers and from the nuisance of its eavesdropping."' 15 Additionally, "the fact that the existence of
these guarantees sometimes results in the exclusion from a trial of probative
evidence is merely a secondary and incidental feature of the privileges'

10.
Recognition of the attorney-client privilege followed the passage of the Statute
of Elizabeth in 1562-1563, which provided penalties for a witness's refusal to testify following service of process and the offer of payment of the witness's expenses. Shuman, supra
note 7, at 669 (citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §
2290, at 542-43 (John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961)). The source of the privilege is
open to speculation. Id. at 670. Although the earliest common law cases made no reference
to Roman law, scholars believe that the jurists had ample opportunity to study and be influenced by Roman jurisprudence. Id. at 671. Also significantly persuasive is the fact that the
first decision to recognize the attorney-client privilege was rendered by the Court of Chancery, a court of equity based on Roman law. Id.
11.
Id. at 671 (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW § 2290, at 543 (John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961)).
12.
Paul S. Appelbaum, Privacy in PsychiatricTreatment: Threats and Responses,
159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1809, 1809-10 (2002).
13.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 63 (Susan Neiburg Terkel & R. Shannon Duval eds.,
1999). Contemporary ethical theories can be divided into two distinct categories: deontological and teleological. Teleological, which encompasses utilitarianism, is the "ethics of
ends and consequences." 1 JOHN K. ROTH, ETHICS 367 (John K. Roth ed., 2005). Teleological theories prioritize the good over the right. See id. The good is defined as "the end or
purpose of human actions; for example, 'the greatest happiness for the greatest number.'
These theories evaluate moral actions in terms of whether they contribute to the good." Id.
Thus, according to teleological theories, consequences or results will determine the rightness
or wrongness of moral actions. Id. This is contrasted with deontological theories, which
argue for the "independence of the right from the good." Id. at 364.
14.
Shuman, supra note 7, at 664 (quoting David Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TuL. L. REV. 101, 101 (1956)).
15.
Id. at 666 n.17 (quoting David Louisell, Confidentiality,Conformity and Confusion: Privilegesin Federal Court Today, 31 TuL. L. REV. 101, 110-11 (1956)).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 29

vitality.' 16 Most importantly, the deontological school of thought views
privacy as "an essential ingredient of a democratic society."' 7
Some two hundred years after the attorney-client privilege was first
recognized in English common law, the English courts were called upon to
address the physician-patient privilege in the 1776 bigamy trial of Elizabeth, the Duchess of Kingston.' 8 During her trial, the Duchess's physician
was called to the stand and asked whether the Duchess had told him of a
prior marriage. The court refused to recognize a physician-patient privilege,
stating:
If a surgeon was voluntarily to reveal these secrets, to be
sure he would be guilty of a breach of honour, and of great
indiscretion; but, to give that information in a court of justice, which by the law of the land he is bound to do, will
never be imputed to him as any indiscretion whatsoever. 19
This decision is viewed as a critical turning point in the law of privilege
because it was at this point that courts began to apply a utilitarian test to
privileges, where the need for the evidence replaced ethics as the standard
for recognition of privileges.2 °
16.
Id. at 664 (quoting David Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion:
Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TuL. L. REV. 101, 101 (1956)).
17.
Id. at 666 (citing ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 32 (1967)). This
concept of privacy was incorporated into the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Justice Brandeis recognized this in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, where he
stated:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable
to the pursuit of happiness.... They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions, and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
18.
Rex v. Duchess of Kingston, (1776) 20 How. St. Tr. 355, 572-73 (H.L.) (Eng.).
19.
Id. at 573.
20.
8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2286, at 531
(John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961). Rex v. Duchess of Kingston is the first known case
to address the issue of a physician-patient privilege. Shuman, supra note 7, at 671. Scholars
speculate that the reason this question was not raised earlier is that medical science was of
little assistance to courts prior to the eighteenth century given the state of medical science at
that time. Id. Others theorize that it was simply assumed that physicians could be compelled
to testify, hence the matter was not litigated. See id. at 671-72. English courts continue to
refuse to recognize the physician-patient privilege, and legislative attempts to recognize this
privilege have not been successful. Id. However, legislative abrogation of this common law
rule has occurred in the United States with the State of New York being the first state to
enact a physician-patient privilege in 1828. See id. at 676.
In France and other civil law European countries, the restriction on the power of
courts to compel the disclosure of certain confidential communications is referred to as the
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In the utilitarian approach, privileges are viewed as obstructions to the
truth-finding process and as fostering a disregard for the fundamental principle that "the public . . . has a right to every man's evidence." 21 Dean

Wigmore identified four requirements necessary for the recognition of a
privilege: (1) the communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed; (2) confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relationship between the parties; (3) the
relationship must be one that, in the opinion of the community, ought to be
sedulously fostered; and (4) the injury to the relationship caused by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit gained for
the correct disposal of litigation. 22 The U.S. Supreme Court has adopted this
approach to the recognition of privileges, stating that privileges should be
utilized "'only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify
or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally
predominant
principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining
23
truth."'
A.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSION AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

The origins of psychiatry can be traced to the practice of medicine
within asylums for the insane during the nineteenth century. It was here that
physicians first began to attribute the deviant behavior of inmates to diseases of the mind and began to search for ways to treat their mentally ill
patients. 24 During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, new varied
professional secret. Id. at 678-79. In France, the physician-patient privilege had its origins in
Roman law, which became the law of the territory now known as France when it was incorporated into the Roman Empire. Shuman, supra note 7, at 679. Professional secrets disappeared for centuries following the invasion by the Teutons and other Germanic tribes. Id.
They were re-established into French law when the Catholic Church reintroduced Roman
law to Western Europe. Id. The attorney-client professional secret was incorporated into the
Decree of Gratian, which became the foundation for the Canon Law Code. See id. at 679.
The physician-patient professional secret has been traced to the incorporation of the Hippocratic Oath in the Constitution of the Paris Medical School during the eighteenth century. Id.
21.
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
22.
8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE INTRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285, at 527
(John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961).
23.
See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (quoting Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
24.
RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM, CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL ASPECTS 43 (4th ed. 2004). Before that time, ancient Romans and Greeks kept the
seriously mentally ill restrained by family members, imprisoned, or exiled. Id. During the
medieval and renaissance periods, the mentally ill were either imprisoned or later confined
to mental hospitals. Id. In either setting, the emphasis was on restraint rather than treatment.

NORTHERN ILUNOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 29

techniques were introduced to treat mental illness.25 However, it was the
development of psychotropic medications in the 1940s that revolutionized
the treatment of serious mental disorders, 26 and, as a result, psychopharmacology currently is27used to treat a broad range of psychotic and less serious
mental conditions.
Psychotherapy, or nonbiological treatment techniques, was first introduced in the early twentieth century. Psychotherapy is defined as the
"treatment of mental or emotional disorder by verbal or other symbolic
communication between patient and therapist.

' 28

Psychoanalysis, developed

by Sigmund Freud, was the first major approach to psychotherapy and rests
upon two major assumptions-that much of mental life is unconscious and
that past experiences, principally those in early childhood, shape how a
person feels and behaves throughout life.29 Freud believed that certain types
of emotional problems stem from the rekindling of repressed emotional
conflicts that originated in early childhood; hence, a key objective of psychoanalysis is to bring these repressed conflicts to the surface in order to
allow the patient to resolve them. However, Freud also believed that individuals are resistant to allowing these repressed thoughts and feelings to
emerge and that this cannot occur unless the patient has control over the
disclosure of the information revealed during therapy. 30 Confidentiality and
trust are, therefore, viewed as the cornerstones for an effective psychoanalytic relationship.3 '
25.
Id. These included "malarial fever therapy," which involved inducing malaria in
a patient; lobotomies, which involved excision of the frontal lobes of the brain; coma therapy; and electroconvulsive therapy. Id.
26.
REISNER ET AL, supra note 24, at 43. In the late 1940s, it was discovered that
lithium could be employed to treat bipolar affective disorders. Id.
27.
Id. at 23.
28.
Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical
Examination of the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 60 N.C. L. REv. 893, 896 (1982)
(citing JOEL KOVEL, A COMPLETE GUIDE TO THERAPY 264 (1976)).
29.
REIsNER ET AL., supra note 24, at 10. This type of therapy is also referred to as
psychodynamic therapy. Id. Freud also believed that the personality has three distinct component parts: the id, ego, and superego. Id. The id is the unconscious part of one's personality that is the caldron of raw drives, such as sex and aggression. Id. The superego is a person's conscience that develops in the early years and is learned from parents and teachers.
Id. The ego is the rational part of the personality whose role is to mediate between the conflicting tensions of the id and superego. Id. When an imbalance between the id and the ego
occurs, a person exhibits psychological distress and displays symptoms of mental disorder.
REISNER ET AL., supra note 24, at 10. The therapist's role is to assist the individual in understanding these conflicts by uncovering the secrets of the unconscious mind. Id.
30.
See Shuman & Weiner, supra note 28, at 897 (citing Anne Beth Uchill, Deviation from Confidentiality and the Therapeutic Holding Environment, 7 INT'L J. PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 208, 210 (1978)).
31.
See REISNER ET AL., supra note 24, at 23. Other versions of the classical form of
psychoanalysis have developed and are termed ego psychology, object relations theory,
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Other approaches to the treatment of mental or emotional disorders
have emerged after Freud that reject the psychoanalytical concept of the
unconscious mind. These include behavioralism and behavior modification,
first introduced in the early twentieth century by B.F. Skinner and J.B. Watson; 32 cognitive-behavioral therapy; 33 and humanistic therapy, whose philosophical roots can be traced to the nineteenth-century philosopher Soren
Keirkegaard.34 Although there are distinctive orientations to psychotherapy
among these approaches, most therapists describe themselves as eclectic in
their practice, employing a variety of treatment approaches.35
Mental health services are currently provided by three distinct categories of professionals: psychiatrists, psychologists, and clinical social workers. 36 While psychiatrists were the dominant providers of mental health care
interpersonal psychology, and self-psychology. Id. Although these various therapies differ in
theory and approach, they have two critical concepts in common. Id. The first involves the
role of the past in shaping the present. Id. The second critical concept that is common to all
forms of psychoanalysis is the belief in the unconscious mind. Id. Therefore, a significant
part of any form of psychodynamic therapy is developing an awareness of one's unconscious, which allows the patient to understand the origins of his behavior. Id. at 33.
32.
REISNER ET AL., supra note 24, at 10. This approach is also referred to as behavior therapy. Id. at 34. Its focus is on observable, overt behaviors that are learned from one's
environment. Id. The environment plays a critical role in behavior modification therapy
because it provides the positive and negative reinforcements that contribute to sustaining or
eliminating certain behaviors. Id. at 10. In behaviorism theory, learning is viewed as behavior change that has been molded by experience and is accomplished through either operant
or classical conditioning. Id. Classical conditioning's foundation is the research of Ivan
Pavlov, the Russian physiologist whose dogs learned to salivate at the sound of a bell after
Pavlov repeatedly paired the sight of food with the sound of a bell. Id. Operant conditioning
is a form of learning in which a voluntary response becomes strengthened or weakened
depending on its connection with positive or negative consequences. REiSNER ET AL., supra
note 24, at 34.
33.
Id. This has developed as a variant of behavior modification. Id. It incorporates
cognitive psychology, the study of the mental processes, including perception, reason, memory and decision making, into the therapeutic process. Id. The therapeutic focus is on the
patient's present thoughts and actions with the goal of changing defective perceptions, replacing them with thoughts and feelings that promote adaptive behaviors. Id. This approach
to therapy believes that people take an active role in deciding what to learn rather than the
passive role put forth in classic behaviorism theory. Id. at 11. It also incorporates cognition-what a person perceives or interprets-in attempting to understand and therefore
change behavior. REISNER ET AL., supra note 24, at 11.

34. Id. at 34-35. It is also termed existential, experiential, or gestalt therapy. Id. at
34. The immediate experience of the client is the central focus of humanistic therapy, which
is rooted in the subjective experiences of the client with a concern for human growth. Id. at
35. A critical aspect of humanistic therapy is the relationship that is created between the
therapist and the client. Id. The therapist serves as the client's guide in "an exploration of
self-discovery," seeking greater self-knowledge and an "expansion of inherent human potential." Id.
35.

36.

REISNER ET AL., supra note 24, at 35.

See, e.g., id.
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until the 1970s, 37 clinical social workers currently provide as much as sixtyfive percent of all psychotherapy and mental health services. 38 All of these
professionals engage in psychotherapy, but the education
and training re39
quired by these professions is significantly different.
Given psychiatry's origin within the medical profession, it is not surprising that the historical foundation of psychotherapeutic confidentiality is
thought to be the Hippocratic Oath, which states in part: "Whatsoever I
shall see or hear in the course of my profession as well as outside my profession in my intercourse with men, if it be what should not be published
abroad, I will never divulge, holding such things to be holy secrets. ' 4°
The right of individuals to control the disclosure of personal medical
information is also closely tied to the notion of personal privacy that was
first acknowledged as a legal concept in the United States at the end of the
nineteenth century.4 1 Justice Brandeis initially conceived of the right to

37.
Id. at 43.
Id. (citing Jeffrey Cohen, Managed Care and the Evolving Role of the Clinical
38.
Social Worker in Mental Health, 48 Soc. WORK 34, 50 (2003)).
39.
See id. at 42-49. A psychiatrist is a licensed physician who has completed a
psychiatric residency program and is the only mental health professional that may prescribe
psychotropic medications. Id. at 43-46. Psychologists emerged as significant providers of
mental health services in the mid-1940s. REISNER ET AL., supra note 24, at 46-47. Prior to
this time, psychology was largely an academically based profession. Id. at 46. However, the
Veterans Administration's large-scale employment of clinical and counseling psychologists
during World War II was the impetus for psychologists to emerge as practitioners in the
mental health field. Id. at 47. Clinical psychologists quickly outnumbered psychiatrists, with
one study indicating the number of practicing psychologists with a Ph.D. or Psy.D. outnumbering psychiatrists more than two to one. Id. Beginning in the 1970s, many states began to
allow persons with a master's degree to practice clinical psychology. See id. at 48. There are
currently no national standards governing the qualifications necessary to practice as a clinical psychologist, and the licensing criteria vary by state. Id.
Clinical social workers typically hold a master of social work degree. REISNER
ET AL., supra note 24, at 49. This degree requires a field placement along with two years of
graduate study. Id. Although they typically function as part of a treatment team, twenty
percent of clinical social workers are currently engaged in private practice. Id. at 49. This is
attributed to the states' willingness to license social workers and the corresponding entitlement to third-party reimbursement, along with the influence of managed care. Id. at 49-52.
40.
Howard B. Roback & Mary Shelton, Effects of Confidentiality Limitations on
the Psychotherapeutic Process, 4 J. PSYCHOTHERAPY PRAC. & RES. 185 (1995). The first
recorded administration of the Hippocratic Oath in a medical school setting was at the University of Wittenberg in Germany in 1508. Howard Markel, "I Swear by Apollo"-On Taking the HippocraticOath, 350 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2026, 2026 (2004). It did not become a
standard part of a formal medical school graduation ceremony until 1804, when it was incorporated into the commencement exercises at Montpellier, France. Id. Today, nearly every
U.S. medical school administers some type of professional oath to its share of about 16,000
annual graduates. Id.
41.
REISNER ET AL., supra note 24, at 297.
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privacy as "'the right to be left alone." 42 While some have argued that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is protected by the constitutional right to
privacy, a liberty interest contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, 43 these arguments have largely been unsuccessful.
In 1952, the Cook County Circuit Court in the State of Illinois became
what some believe to be the first U.S. court to recognize a psychotherapistpatient privilege."4 In Binder v. Ruvell, Dr. Roy Grinker, a prominent psychiatrist, and Michael Reese Hospital were summoned to produce the medical records of a Mrs. Binder, who was a recent patient at the hospital. 45 Mrs.

Binder was not a party to the case but was somehow related to the plaintiff,
Samuel Binder.46 Both the hospital authorities and Dr. Grinker refused to
testify or otherwise reveal Mrs. Binder's medical information.4 7 Judge
Harry M. Fisher ruled that the information provided by a patient to a psychiatrist during psychotherapy sessions was protected from disclosure, even
though the State of Illinois, at the time, did not recognize a physicianpatient privilege. 48 Judge Fisher focused on the distinction between a physician-patient privilege and the relationship between a psychiatrist and a patient, noting that the latter relationship more closely resembled the confessional nature of the priest-penitent relationship.49 In determining whether
Illinois law should recognize this new privilege, Judge Fisher adopted the
utilitarian approach and analyzed the psychotherapist-patient privilege in
terms of the four elements proposed by Dean Wigmore5 He concluded that

42.
Id. (quoting Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890)).
Bruce J. Winick, The Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege: A Therapeutic Juris43.
prudence View, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV.249, 251 (1996).
44.
Binder v. Ruvell, No. 52C2535 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County June 24, 1952), available at http://jaffee-redmond.org/cases/binder.htm. At the time this case was filed, the State
of Illinois did not recognize a physician-patient privilege. Id.

45.

Id.

50.

Id. These factors are: (1) the communications must originate in a confidence

46.
Id. The court opinion does not identify Mrs. Binder's first name nor does it
explain the relationship between her and the plaintiff. Id.
47.
Id.
48.
Binder v. Ruvell, No. 52C2535 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County June 24, 1952), available at http://jaffee-redmond.org/cases/binder.htm.
49.
Id.
that they will not be disclosed, (2) the element of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties, (3) the relation must be one
that in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered, and (4) the injury that

would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communication must be greater than the
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation. Id.
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the protection of the confidences that arise in the psychotherapist-patient
51
relationship far outweighs the "correct disposal of a particular case."
During the mid- to late-1950s, the idea that therapy patients might
need unique legal protections took hold, and the concept of the psychiatristpatient privilege was actively debated.52 Numerous articles and texts were
published in which the authors openly advocated for the privilege, arguing
that public policy grounds justify the existence of the privilege because the
psychiatric patient
has a special need for protection of his confidential
53
communications.
51.
Id.
52.
Paul W. Mosher, Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: The History and Significance of the U.S. Supreme Court's Decision in the Case of Jaffee v. Redmond (1999) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://jaffee-redmond.org/articles/mosher.htm).
53.
See, e.g., MANFRED S. GUTTMACHER & HENRY WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE
LAW 272 (1952). In explaining the need for a privilege for "psychiatric patients," the authors
of the text were clearly speaking of psychoanalysis or psychoanalytic psychotherapy. See id.
They explain:
The psychiatrist must insist on very personal data, and must explore the relationship of the patient's acts to his basic drives, which can
only be adequately revealed by his deepest and most secret thoughts and
feelings. This is true not only in psychoanalysis but in all psychotherapy
[i.e., psychoanalytic psychotherapy]. The possibly neurotic nature of
even such patently criminal acts as forgery or theft cannot be determined
without exploring their patient's attitudes and behavior in regard to masturbation, homosexuality, etc.
What is more, the patient's statements may reveal to his therapist
much more than the patient intends or realizes. The psychiatric patient
confides much more utterly than anyone else in the world. He exposes to
the therapist not only what his words directly express; he lays bare his
entire self, his dreams, his fantasies, his sins, and his shame. Most patients who undergo psychotherapy know that this is what will be expected of them, and that they cannot get help except on that condition. It
is extremely hard for them to bring themselves to the point where they
are willing to expose the dark recesses of their mind to the psychiatrist;
often patients have undergone therapy for a year or more before they begin to reveal anything significant. It would be too much to expect them
to do so if they knew that all they say-and all that the psychiatrist
learns from what they say-may be revealed to the whole world from a
witness stand.
Id.
About the same time, Ralph Slovenko published an influential law review article in the Wayne Law Review in which he argued that, unlike the ordinary health care situation, the psychiatrist's relationship with his patient fully satisfies the criteria of Dean Wigmore. See Ralph Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6
WAYNE L. REV. 175 (1960). The article concluded: "The following is by way of recommendation: The confidential relations and communication between psychiatrist and patient in a
treatment relationship is absolutely privileged, subject to express waiver by the patient, and
upon his death, when waiver can fairly be presumed." Id. at 203.
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In 1960, the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (GAP) issued a
report entitled Confidentiality and Privileged Communication in the Practice of Psychiatry, which included this frequently quoted passage that amply articulated the need for the privilege:
Among physicians, the psychiatrist has a special
need to maintain confidentiality. His capacity to
help his patients is completely dependent upon
their willingness and ability to talk freely. This
makes it difficult if not impossible for him to function without being able to assure his patients of
confidentiality and, indeed, privileged communication ....There is wide agreement that confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful psychiatric
treatment. The relationship may well be likened to
that of the priest-penitent or the lawyer-client. Psychiatrists not only explore the very depths of their
patients' conscious, but their unconscious feelings
and attitudes as well. Therapeutic effectiveness necessitates going beyond a patient's awareness and,
in order to do this, it must be possible to communicate freely.
A threat to secrecy blocks successful
54
treatment.
The report concluded with a proposed model statute, which read: "The confidential relationship and communication between psychiatrist and patient
shall be placed on the same basis as regards privilege, as provided by law,
between attorney and client." 55 The GAP proposal was not accepted by
legal scholars or therapists.
Subsequently, the State of Connecticut formed a committee under the
auspices of the Connecticut branch of the American Psychiatric Association
and the Connecticut Mental Health Association. 56 Committee members
included representatives of the American Psychiatric Association, along
with attorneys from the community and faculty from Yale Law School.
This committee's work ultimately resulted in the enactment of a psycho-

54.

Mosher, supra note 52 (quoting GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY,

CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION IN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 92

(1960)).
55.

Id. (quoting GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, CONFIDENTIALITY
92 (1960)).
Id.
Id.

AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION IN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY

56.
57.
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therapist-patient privilege statute in Connecticut.5 8 The statute applied in
59
civil and criminal cases and in legislative and administrative proceedings.
It covered communications between patients and psychotherapists and extended the privilege to communications between patients and individuals
working under the supervision of the therapist, such as psychologists and
social workers. 60 It included three exceptions to the privilege: (1) proceedings to hospitalize a patient, (2) court ordered psychiatric examinations, and
(3) cases in which a patient has introduced his mental condition into a case
in a civil proceeding. 61 Several states subsequently enacted similar laws,
and the Connecticut law ultimately formed the basis for the U.S. Supreme
Court's subsequent proposal
for a psychotherapist-patient privilege in the
62
Federal Rules of Evidence.
The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence submitted to Congress in
1969 by the Supreme Court initially included provisions for the recognition
of nine federal privileges, 63 including a psychotherapist-patient privilege,
which was set forth in proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 5 0 4 .64 The pro58.
Id. (citing Abraham Goldstein & Jay Katz, Psychiatrist-PatientPrivilege: The
GAP Proposaland the Connecticut Statute, 118 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 733 (1962)).
59. Id.
60. Mosher, supra note 52.
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
The proposed rules recognized privileges for court ordered or other legally
required reports, an attorney-client privilege, a psychotherapist-patient privilege, a priestpenitent privilege, a spousal testimonial privilege, a trade secrets privilege, a political vote
privilege, and privileges for secrets of state and informer identity. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 2, § 5.6, at 302.
64.
Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183,
240-41 (1972) (setting out proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504). Proposed Federal Rule
of Evidence 504 reads:
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege [Not enacted.]
(a) Definitions.
(1) A "patient" is a person who consults or is examined or interviewed by a psychotherapist.
(2) A "psychotherapist" is (A) a person authorized to practice
medicine in any state or nation, or reasonably believed by the
patient so to be, while engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of
a mental or emotional condition, including drug addiction, or
(B) a person licensed or certified as a psychologist under the
laws of any state or nation, while similarly engaged.
(3) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be
disclosed to third persons other than those present to further
the interest of the patient in the consultation, examination, or
interview, or persons reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication, or persons who are participating in
the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist, including members of the patient's family.
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posed rule protected confidential communications between patients and
physicians or psychologists made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment
of mental or emotional conditions.65 The rule contained three specific exceptions that were essentially the same as those contained in the Connecticut statute. There was no privilege for communications made pursuant to
proceedings to hospitalize a patient, for communications made in connection with court ordered psychiatric examinations, or for communications
made in connection with civil proceedings in which a patient has introduced
his mental condition into the case. 66
In 1973, the proposed rules were submitted to Congress for approval.67
However, the proposed rules, and particularly article V dealing with privi-

Id.

(b) General Rule of Privilege. A patient has a privilege to refuse
to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications, made for the purposes of diagnosis or
treatment of his mental or emotional condition, including drug addiction, among himself, his psychotherapist, or persons who are
participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the
psychotherapist, including members of the patient's family.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed
by the patient, by his guardian or conservator, or by the personal
representative of a deceased patient. The person who was the psychotherapist may claim the privilege but only on behalf of the patient. His authority so to do is presumed in the absence of evidence
to the contrary.
(d) Exceptions.
(1) Proceedings for hospitalization. There is no privilege under this rule for communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if the
psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has determined that the patient is in need of hospitalization.
(2) Examination by order of judge. If the judge orders an examination of the mental or emotional condition of the patient,
communications made in the course thereof are not privileged
under this rule with respect to the particular purpose for which
the examination is ordered unless the judge orders otherwise.
(3) Condition an element of claim or defense. There is no
privilege under this rule as to communications relevant to an
issue of the mental or emotional condition of the patient in any
proceeding in which he relies upon the condition as an element
of his claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any
proceeding in which any party relies upon the condition as an
element of his claim or defense.

65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Hegelian Approach to Privileges Under Federal
Rule of Evidence 501: The Restrictive Thesis, the Expansive Antithesis, and the Contextual
Synthesis, 73 NEB. L. REv. 511,512 (1994).
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leges, got caught up in the political cross fire arising out of the Watergate
scandal.68 Unable to resolve the controversies surrounding these proposed
rules, Congress ultimately decided to eliminate all of the proposed privileges and to substitute a single rule, rule 501 .69 Federal Rule of Evidence
501 provides that privileges "shall be governed by the principles of the
common law" as interpreted "in the light of reason and experience," and it
applies uniformly to both criminal and civil cases. 7 °
In 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court was called upon to determine
whether federal courts should recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege.
In Jaffee v. Redmond, seven members of the Supreme Court found that the
communications between a patient and her therapist were protected from
disclosure by a psychotherapist-patient privilege. 71 The case involved Mary
Lu Redmond, a police officer for the Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois,
who shot and killed a young man while on patrol duty.72 Following this
incident, she received extensive therapy from a licensed clinical social
worker.7 3 Petitioner, the administrator of the decedent's estate, filed a §
1983 action in federal court against the officer and the Village of Hoffman
Estates, alleging that the respondents had violated the decedent's constitutional rights by the use of excessive force.74
During the pretrial discovery phase of the litigation, the petitioner
sought access to the therapist's notes of her sessions with Officer Redmond. 75 Respondents objected to the request on the ground that the infor68.
Id. at 512-14. Hearings took place in both the House and Senate where testimony for and against proposed rule 504 was heard. Id. Importantly, proposed rule 504 was
opposed by both the American Medical Association and the American Bar Association since
article V did not provide for a physician-patient privilege, a privilege for spousal communications, or a journalist privilege. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 2, § 5.6, at 302.
69.
Imwinkelried, supra note 67, at 514.
70.
FED. R. EvID. 501. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by
the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in light of reason and experience. However,
in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege
of a witness, person, government, State or political subdivision thereof
shall be determined in accordance with State law.
Id.
71.
518 U.S. 1 (1996). Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented. Id. at
18 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72.
Id. at 4 (majority opinion).
73.
Id. at 5.
74. Id.
75.
Id.
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mation was protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege.76 The district
court rejected this argument; however, neither Redmond nor her therapist
complied with the order to disclose the contents of the notes.7 At the close
of the trial, the judge instructed the jury that the refusal to turn over the
notes had no "legal justification" and, therefore, the jury could presume that
the contents would have been detrimental to the defendants. 78 The jury
awarded the petitioner $545,000 in damages. 79 The Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded the case. 80 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide whether "it is appropriate for federal courts to recognize
a 'psychotherapist privilege' under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.'

The Court began its discussion by noting that rule 501 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence allows federal courts to recognize new privileges by
interpreting "common law principles ... in the light of reason and experience" 82 and that it directed the federal courts to "'continue the evolutionary
development of testimonial privileges."' 83 However, it also recognized the
general principle limiting the recognition of privileges, stating:
For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the public..
. has a right to every man's evidence. When we
76.
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 5.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
Id. at 6.
80.
Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1995), aff'd, 518 U.S. 1 (1996). The
circuit court found that the "reason and experience" criterion of Federal Rule of Evidence
501 required the recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege. Id. at 1354-55. However,
the court did not find the privilege to be unqualified; rather, it adopted a balancing test and
ruled that the privilege would not apply if "in the interests of justice, the evidentiary need for
the disclosure of the contents of a patient's counseling sessions outweighs that patient's
privacy interests." Id. at 1357. In applying the balancing test, the court observed that there
were ample eyewitnesses to the shooting and, because of this, found that the evidentiary
need for the psychotherapist-patient communications was diminished while Redmond's
interest in preventing disclosure of the contents of the communications was substantial. Id. at
1358.
81.
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 4. There was a split in the federal circuits over whether the
"reason and experience" test in rule 501 compelled the recognition of the psychotherapistpatient privilege in civil and criminal cases. See Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1354-55. The Second and
Sixth Circuits had recognized the privilege. See In re Doe, 964 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1992); In
re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1983). Conversely, the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits rejected the privilege. See United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1994);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Corona, 849
F.2d 562 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1976).
82.
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 8.
83.
Id. at 9 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,47 (1990)).
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come to examine the various claims of exemption,
we start with the primary assumption that there is a
general duty to give what testimony one is capable
of giving, and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being 84so many derogations from a positive general rule.
The Court explained that exceptions from the rule disfavoring testimonial
privileges may be justified by a public good. 85 Applying the utilitarian approach, it noted that deciding whether the psychotherapist-patient privilege
was justified required the Court to determine whether the protection of confidential communications between a patient and her therapist advances considerably important interests so as to outweigh the need for relevant evi86
dence.
The Court found that the psychotherapist-patient privilege does advance important private and public interests. 87 It found that private interests
are served when the communications between a patient and her therapist are
protected from involuntary disclosure because effective psychotherapy demands "an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories,
and fears. 88 The Court also remarked that the "mere possibility" of disclosure of confidential communications could obstruct the development of the
confidential relationship required for treatment to be successful. 89 "'Where
there may be exceptions to this general rule . . . , there is wide agreement
that confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful psychiatric treatment."' 90 The Court also found that the protection of confidential communications between patients and therapists serves an important public interests because it facilitates the provision of mental health services, remarking,
"The mental health of our citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a
public good of transcendent importance., 91

84.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331
(1950)).
85.
Id.
86.
Id. at 9-10.
87.
Id. at 10.
88.
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10.
Id.
89.
90.
Id. at 10-11 (alteration in original) (quoting Rules of Evidence for the United
States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1972)). It equated the psychotherapistpatient privilege to the spousal and attorney-client privileges in that they are "'rooted in the
imperative need for confidence and trust."' Id. at 10 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445
U.S. 40, 50 (1990)).
91.
Id. at 11.
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Continuing its analysis, the Court weighed the public and private interests served by the privilege against the value of the evidence expected to
be produced in the absence of a privilege.92 The Court suggested that little
valuable evidence would be produced in the absence of a privilege because
patients would be hesitant to disclose confidential information. It noted:
If the privilege were rejected, confidential conversations
between psychotherapists and their patients would surely
be chilled, particularly when it is obvious that the circumstances that give rise to the need for treatment will probably result in litigation. Without a privilege, much of the desirable evidence to which litigants such as petitioner seek
access-for example, admissions against interest by a
party-is unlikely to come into being. This unspoken "evidence" will therefore serve no greater truth-seeking function than if it had been spoken and privileged.9 3
The Court refused to identify exceptions to the privilege since it was
not required to do so at that time. 94 Justice Stevens, however, hinted that the
privilege might not apply in situations involving a "serious threat of harm to
the patient or to 9others
[that] can be averted only by means of a disclosure
5
therapist.
by the
92.
Id. at 11-12.
93.
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11-12. The Court ruled that the psychotherapist-patient privilege pertains with equal force to psychologists and clinical social workers. Id. at 15-17. In
doing so, it recognized the role these professionals currently play in mental health treatment.
Id. Its ruling is consistent with the vast majority of states, which also extend the privilege to
licensed social workers. Id. at 16-17. The Court rejected the case by case balancing test that
was applied by the court of appeals on the grounds that a balancing test would effectively

destroy the privilege, stating:
Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge's
later evaluation of the relative importance of the patient's interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege .... [T]he participants in the confidential conversation "must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether
particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one
which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by
the courts, is little better than no privilege at all."
Id. at 17-18 (quoting Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)).
94. Id.
at 18.
95. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 n.19. Justice Scalia dissented and was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 18-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He criticized the majority for ignoring
the "traditional judicial preference for the truth," id. at 19, and for "creating a privilege that
is new, vast, and ill defined," id. at 19-20. He questioned whether the privilege truly serves
personal interests and whether there is a public benefit resulting from the privilege. Id. at 22.
He asked:
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In recognizing the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the Supreme
Court has acknowledged what psychiatrists and other mental health professionals have long believed-that confidentiality is essential to the therapeutic relationship. The American Psychoanalytic Association believes that
analysis cannot proceed without the formation of a rational, trusting therapeutic alliance 96 and that the threat that a therapist might reveal a patient's
most revealing secrets in a court of law would "stand as a permanent obstacle to development of the necessary degree of patient trust," which would
pose a "significant,' 97and for many patients an insurmountable, barrier to
effective treatment.

When is it, one must wonder, that the psychotherapist came to
play such an indispensable role in the maintenance of the citizenry's
mental health? For most of history, men and women have worked out
their difficulties by talking to, inter alios, parents, siblings, best friends,
and bartenders-none of whom was awarded a privilege against testifying in court. Ask the average citizen: Would your mental health be more
significantly impaired by preventing you from seeing a psychotherapist,
or by preventing you from getting advice from your mom? I have little
doubt what the answer would be. Yet there is no mother-child privilege.

Id. at 22.
96.
Brief for the American Psychoanalytic Association et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 5, Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (No. 95-266) (citing
HAROLD KAPLAN & BENJAMIN SADOCK, COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1775
(6th ed. 1995)).
97.
Id. (citing ROBERT LANGS, THE TECHNIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYTIC
PSYCHOTHERAPY 193 (1973)). Disclosure of the content of therapy in court would be embarrassing or job threatening. Id. at 4. Given the social stigma that remains attached to psychotherapy, the mere disclosure that an individual is in therapy could be detrimental. Id. The
association further considers confidentiality to be essential in the therapist-patient relationship as it allows patients to fully disclose thoughts and feelings without fear of disclosure.
Id. at 7. Full disclosure is an essential component of psychoanalytic therapy that assumes
that conscious thoughts and feelings are caused by unconscious factors. Id. at 7-8 (citing
CHARLES BRENNER, AN ELEMENTARY TExTBOOK OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 9 (1973)). Itis
through full disclosure and the process known as "free association" that the therapist and
patient can successfully bring unconscious material "into the light of consciousness." Brief
for the American Psychoanalytic Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9, Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (No. 95-266). Anna Freud has noted:
"'[C]onfidentiality of the material ...is a prerequisite for free association. No analysand
succeeds in divesting himself of all defenses or controls unless he can be certain that the
derivatives of his id will not become known beyond the confines of the analytic situation."'
Id. at 11 (alterations in original) (quoting 4 ANNA FREUD, THE WRITINGS OF ANNA FREUD
417 (1968)). The disclosure of this "private personality," although necessary for successful
treatment, could be "devastating if revealed to ordinary scrutiny." Ralph Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REv. 175, 194 (1960). The
establishment of a psychotherapist-patient privilege is necessary because in a psychotherapeutic situation, treatment is directed towards feelings and attitudes that are unacceptable to
the patient and to society. See id.
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Similarly, the American Psychological Association has noted that the
establishment of trust between the therapist and the patient "'has been
deemed so essential by some that it has been argued that psychotherapy is
rendered worthless in its absence."' 98 The association has argued against the
recognition of exceptions to the privilege for court proceedings, stating:
"The privilege would have little value if it could be abrogated whenever
information from therapy
sessions might have a significant impact on the
99
outcome of the case."

In keeping with the need to protect the confidentiality of the therapeutic relationship, the various professions engaged in the mental health field
98.
Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Psychological Association in Support of
Respondents at 12, Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (No. 95-266) [hereinafter American Psychological Association Brief] (quoting Mark B. DeKraai & Bruce D. Sales, Privileged Communicationsof Psychologists, 14 PROF. PSYCHOL. 372, 372 (1982)).
99.
American Psychological Association Brief, supra note 98, at 23. Countless
others have expressed the need for trust and openness in the therapeutic relationship for
which confidentiality is the cornerstone. See Patricia Honea-Boles & Jean E. Griffin, The
Court Mandated Client: Does Limiting Confidentiality Preclude a Therapeutic Encounter?,
29 TEx. COUNSELING ASS'N J. 149, 150 (2001). The authors present numerous works and
studies that support the proposition that the stronger the therapeutic relationship the more
beneficial the therapy to the patient. The major psychotherapeutic theories indicate that
successful therapy outcomes are dependent upon the relationship between the therapist and
the patient. Id. at 150 (citing Charles J. Gelso & Jean A. Carter, Components of the Psychotherapy Relationship: Their Interactionand Unfolding During Treatment, 41 J. COUNSELING
PSYCHOL. 296 (1994)). The therapists' warmth or acceptance and empathic resonance are
positively correlated with therapeutic outcome. Id. (citing David E.Orlinsky & Kenneth I.
Howard, Process and Outcome in Psychotherapy, in MICHAEL J. LAMBERT, HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHOTHERAPY AND BEHAVIOR CHANGE

311-81 (Sol L. Garfield & Allen E. Bergin eds.,

5th ed. 2004)). A therapist's unconditional regard for the patient allows for therapeutic
change. Id. (citing Carl R. Rogers, The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Therapeutic
Personality Change, 21 J. COUNSELING PSYCH. 95 (1957)). A strong working alliance has
been demonstrated to result in positive outcomes and is viewed as the most fundamental
factor of the therapeutic relationship. Id. at 150-52. Alliance is viewed as consisting of three
components: (1) an agreement on the goals of the relationship, (2) agreement on the tasks,
and (3) the development of an intimate bond between the parties with trust at the center.
Honea-Boles & Griffin, supra at 151 (citing Edward S. Bordin, The Generalizabilityof the
Psychoanalytic Concept of the Working Alliance, 16 PSYCHOTHERAPY THEORY, RES. &
PRAC. 252, 252-59 (1992)). Three factors have been found to correlate with positive therapeutic outcomes:
(1) Role investment: an investment of energy, by both the client (expressed through self-expression and emotional attachment to the therapist) and the therapist (through active participation); (2) Empathic resonance: mutual nondefensiveness, mutual trust and mutual comfortableness; and, (3) Mutual affirmation: mutual good will, born out of respect
for autonomy, which encourages and accepts another's independence.
h. (citing David E.Orlinsky & Kenneth I. Howard, Process and Outcome in Psychotherapy,
in MICHAEL J. LAMBERT, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOTHERAPY AND BEHAVIOR CHANGE 311-81
(Sol L. Garfield & Allen E. Bergin eds., 5th ed. 2004)).
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employ a code of ethics that imposes on its members a duty to protect patients' confidences."° Sanctions for violation of these ethical duties include
censure, expulsion from professional organizations, and the potential for
suspension or loss of one's professional license.' 0 ' These ethical rules are
enforced independently of the evidentiary rules of privilege and, in some
ways, may provide more protection than legal privileges. While privileges
protect against the disclosure of confidential communications, they apply
only to testimony in legal proceedings. Conversely, the duty of confidentiality is not limited to judicial settings and applies to matters not covered by
privileges, such as nonconfidential communications and secrets that are not
communications. Absolute confidentiality, however, can only be assured if
an evidentiary privilege applies alongside a professional duty of confidentiality. In the absence of a privilege, a person called as a witness can be com100.
See, e.g., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS
AND CODE OF CONDUCT § 4 (2002), available at http://www.apa.org/ethics/code20O2.pdf.

Some relevant subsections of American Psychological Association's code of conduct are as
follows:
4.01 Maintaining Confidentiality
Psychologists have a primary obligation and take reasonable precautions to protect confidential information obtained through or
stored in any medium, recognizing that the extent and limits of confidentiality may be regulated by law or established by institutional
rules or professional or scientific relationship....
4.02 Discussing the Limits of Confidentiality
(a) Psychologists discuss with persons (including, to the extent feasible, persons who are legally incapable of giving informed consent
and their legal representatives) and organizations with whom they
establish a scientific or professional relationship (1) the relevant
limits of confidentiality and (2) the foreseeable uses of the information generated through their psychological activities....
(b) Unless it is not feasible or is contraindicated, the discussion of
confidentiality occurs at the outset of the relationship and thereafter
as new circumstances may warrant....
4.05 Disclosures
(a) Psychologists may disclose confidential information with the
appropriate consent of the organizational client, the individual client/patient, or another legally authorized person on behalf of the
client/patient unless prohibited by law.
(b) Psychologists disclose confidential information without the consent of the individual only as mandated by law, or where permitted
by law for a valid purpose such as to (1) provide needed professional services; (2) obtain appropriate professional consultations;
(3) protect the client/patient, psychologist, or others from harm; or
(4) obtain payment for services from a client/patient, in which instance disclosure is limited to the minimum that is necessary to
achieve the purpose.
Id.
101.
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 2, § 5.3, at 290.
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pelled to disclose confidential communications despite a professional ethical requirement of confidentiality. In fact, most ethical standards provide an
exception
to the confidentiality requirement when the disclosure is required
02
law.'
by

III.

THE EMPIRICAL STUDIES: SUPPORT FOR THE
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

The major psychoanalytic theories, along with opinions of the various
associations of mental health professionals, stress the importance of confidentiality in the patient-therapist relationship to the successful outcome of
therapy. Additionally, the Jaffee v. Redmond decision represents a significant affirmation by the Supreme Court of the necessity for absolute confidentiality in psychotherapy. However, it has been suggested by some that
the need for confidentiality may not be as important as represented and that
those who have examined the psychotherapist-patient privilege have "uncritically accepted" the need for this privilege.10 3 The following section
presents a synopsis of the empirical research in this area, which overwhelmingly contradicts this assertion and reaffirms the necessity for the privilege.
One of the earliest studies reported in legal journals on this topic is a
1962 student comment published in the Yale Law Journal entitled Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals.104 This article
presented a questionnaire study of psychiatrists, marriage counselors, psychologists, lawyers, judges, and lay people. It reported that the majority of
lay people were unaware of a privilege for communications with marriage
counselors, psychologists, and psychiatrists. 10 5 Even so, approximately
forty-four percent of the lay people questioned indicated they would be less
likely to make a "free and complete disclosure" to psychologists and psychiatrists106if the therapist had a legal obligation to disclose the information to
a court.

102.
See AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, supra note 100, § 4.05(b) ("Psychologists
disclose confidential information without the consent of the individual only as mandated by
law, or where permitted by law for a valid purpose such as to (1) provide needed professional services; (2) obtain appropriate professional consultations; (3) protect the client/patient, psychologist, or others from harm; or (4) obtain payment for services from a
client/patient, in which instance disclosure is limited to the minimum that is necessary to
achieve the purpose.").
103.
Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical
Examination of the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 60 N.C. L. REV. 894 (1981).
104.
Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals:
Its Implicationsfor the PrivilegedCommunications Doctrine,71 YALE L.J. 1226 (1962).

105.

106.

Id.at 1261.

Id. at 1262.
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THE SHUMAN AND WEINER STUDIES

Researchers Daniel Shuman and Myron Weiner conducted three separate empirical studies on the effects of privilege on the psychotherapist10 7
patient relationship and its concomitant effect on the quality of therapy.
The first study was conducted in 1979 and was prompted by the passage of
a psychotherapist-patient privilege in Texas. 10 8 The second study was conducted three years later in South Carolina and West Virginia. 109 At the time,
these were the only two states in the United States that did not recognize a
psychotherapist-patient privilege, which afforded Shuman and Weiner an
opportunity to observe psychotherapist-patient communications and court
proceedings in the absence of a privilege.' 10
The third study was conducted in Montreal and Toronto, Canada and
was prompted by the difference in the law of privileges in Quebec, a civil
law jurisdiction, and Ontario, a common law jurisdiction.'
While the
common law has traditionally limited disclosure of communications only in
the attorney-client context, the civil law prohibits disclosure of confidential
communications in a variety of relationships, including attorney-client,
physician-patient, notaries-client, and dentist-patient.I 2
107.
Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical
Examination of the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 60 N.C. L. REv. 893 (1981) [hereinafter Privilege Study I]. The second and third studies are Daniel W. Shuman & Myron F.
Weiner, Privilege-a Comparative Study, 12 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 373 (1984) [hereinafter
Privilege Study II], and Gilbert Pinard, Daniel W. Shuman & Myron F. Weiner, The Privilege Study (PartIII): Psychotherapist-PatientCommunications in Canada, 9 INTER. J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 393 (1987) [hereinafter PrivilegeStudy 111], respectively.
108.
PrivilegeStudy I, supra note 107, at 895-96.
109.
PrivilegeStudy II, supra note 107, at 373.
110.
See id. at 374.
111.
Privilege Study III, supra note 107, at 393, 406, 409. Professor Gilbert Pinard, a
professor of psychiatry and chairman of the department of psychiatry at the medical school
at McGill University in Montreal, Canada, also participated in the study. Id. at 393.
112.
Id. The authors note that Canadian judges in common law jurisdictions appear
to be uncomfortable with the absence of a physician-patient privilege, which has given way
to the existence of an "underground privilege." Id. at 396. The authors discuss numerous
cases that appear to recognize this privilege. See, e.g., Slavutych v. Baker, [1975] 1 S.C.R.
254 (Can.) (declining to admit an evaluation for tenure given with the understanding that it
would be confidential); Shakotko v. Shakotko, [1976] 27 R.F.L. 1 (Can.) (citing English
cases for the proposition that the common law favors marital reconciliation and should not
aggravate that objective by destroying the confidentiality of marital therapy); Dembie v.
Dembie, [1963] 21 R.F.L. 46 (Can.) (finding it "shocking" that a woman could encourage
her husband to visit her psychiatrist, subsequently summon the psychiatrist to court, and
have the court force her psychiatrist to disclose everything her husband said to the psychiatrist in confidence, and refusing to call a psychiatrist who saw a husband and wife for counseling to testify to what occurred in therapy). Id. at 396-401. The authors also point out that
although Quebec recognizes the professional secret, there are numerous exceptions to these
privileges. Id. at 405. For example, Canadian federal criminal law does not recognize a
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The hypotheses and methodology were identical in all three of the
studies. The authors set out to test the correctness of the following premises: (1) that "[t]he absence of a privilege deters people from seeking
needed therapy"; 1 3 (2) that "[t]he absence of a privilege impairs the quality of therapy"; 1 4 and (3) that "[t]he absence of privilege leads to comcommunications, which results in psypelled judicial disclosure of patient
5
patients.""
to
harm
chological
The researchers employed the same four questionnaires in all three
practicing psyof individuals:
studies and sent them to the same category
17
'16
chiatrists, current patients, "lay persons," and judges.1
The researchers concluded that the lack of a psychotherapist-patient
privilege would not deter patients from seeking psychiatric help nor would
the lack of a privilege necessarily impair the quality of therapy." 8 However,
they found that a significant percentage of the respondents were either unaware of whether their jurisdiction had a privilege statute or believed that
the therapists' professional code of ethics provided adequate assurances of
confidentiality.'1 19
physician-patient privilege. Privilege Study III, supra note 107, at 393. Furthermore, the
physician-patient privilege is not applicable in physician discipline proceedings, medical
malpractice actions, psychiatric detention proceedings, or child abuse proceedings. Id. at
405-06.
113.
Privilege Study 1, supra note 107, at 898; Privilege Study III, supra note 107, at
394-95.
Privilege Study I, supra note 107, at 898; PrivilegeStudy II, supra note 107, at
114.
394-95.
Privilege Study I, supra note 107, at 898; PrivilegeStudy III, supra note 107, at
115.
394-95.
116.
Lay persons were defined as individuals that were not in therapy. Privilege
Study I, supra note 107, at 917. The first study identified lay persons as students in night
classes at a university but did not necessarily rule out individuals in therapy. Id.
117.
See Privilege Study I, supra note 107, at 917; Privilege Study II, supra note 107,
at 374; Privilege Study III, supranote 107, at 406-09.
118.
Privilege Study I, supra note 107, at 924-25. In the Texas study, ninety-three
percent of the lay people responded that they would seek help for serious emotional problems. Id. at 925. Seventy-four percent of the lay people indicated that they were unaware of
the Texas privilege statute, whereas ninety-six percent believed that the therapists' ethics
provided adequate assurances of confidentiality. Id. Shuman and Weiner did not find statistically significant differences in responses to their questionnaires in the South Carolina and
West Virginia study compared to the Texas study. Privilege Study II, supra note 107, at 37880. As in the Texas study, the authors concluded that the absence of a privilege statute did
not seem to have a significant impact on the conduct of therapy nor did it appear to significantly impede the process of psychotherapy. Id.
119.
In the West Virginia and South Carolina studies, a significant portion (forty-one
percent) of the patients responded that they were unaware that their state did not have a
privilege statute. Id. at 381. Interestingly, and similar to the Texas study, eighty-six percent
of the patients indicated that they relied upon the professional ethics of their therapist to
guarantee the privacy of their communications. Privilege Study III, supra note 107, at 414.
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The authors did find that there was an impact on the therapeutic relationship once a therapist threatened to disclose or actually disclosed confidential communications. Their data demonstrated that patients' willingness
to disclose actions that carry legal consequences is significantly affected by
the lack of privilege, 12 particularly those actions1 21involving violent urges,
speeding, physical violence, theft, and tax evasion.
The authors were unable to determine whether patients were psychologically harmed by their therapists' disclosures, but a small number of
therapists reported that patients terminated therapy following a report or
that the level of trust in the relationship was significantly diminished.12 2
There did appear to be a slight difference in responses among the
judges that were surveyed in the three studies.1 23 Not all of the judges believed that recognition of the privilege would render judicial proceedings
inaccurate. 124 Judges in both Canadian jurisdictions reported that the admisIn Canada, equal percentages of patients in Toronto and Montreal believed a privilege statue
was in existence. Id. at 407. Both groups reported that they relied more on the therapist's
personal and professional ethics than the privilege to protect their confidentiality. Id. at 41112.
120.
The Texas patient surveys indicated that thirty-four percent of the items patients
withheld from their therapists involved sexual thoughts, while thirty-six percent involved
sexual acts. Privilege Study I, supra note 107, at 926. Thoughts of violence were reported to
be withheld only nine percent of the time. Id. In the West Virginia and South Carolina study,
as in the Texas study, when posed with questions testing the willingness to disclose or discuss selected subjects, the topics that were most likely to have legal consequences were the
most affected by the lack of the privilege. Privilege Study III, supra note 107, at 413-14. In
Canada, the respondents in both groups indicated that they would be less willing to discuss
sexual acts and thoughts with a therapist. Id. at 407, 410. Additionally, both groups of respondents indicated that they would be significantly less likely to respond to questions about
speeding, physical violence, and work failure. Id.
121.
Privilege Study I, supra note 107, at 926. The lay people also indicated that they
would be less likely to discuss masturbation, sexual thoughts, and sexual activities with a
therapist in the absence of a privilege. Id.
122.
Id. Almost thirty percent of the therapists reported that they did not know
whether their patients had experienced harm as the result of their disclosures. Id. at 921, 927.
The therapists' responses indicated that twelve patients were in therapy at the time the therapist disclosed confidential communications. Id. Of the twelve, two terminated therapy with
the therapist, and the therapy of another two patients was reported to be affected by the
diminished level of trust. Id.
123.
Surprisingly, the researchers found that the Texas judges were often unaware of
the privilege. Privilege Study I, supra note 107, at 924.
124.
See id. at 927. Four of the Texas judges who were involved in family law matters reported that these communications were necessary, while three reported that disclosure
of confidential therapist-patient communications was not necessary for an accurate resolution of the cases. Id. Forty-five percent of the responding judges in West Virginia and South
Carolina indicated that the question of whether to admit confidential psychotherapist-patient
communications had arisen before them. Privilege Study 111, supra note 107, at 415. Of this
group, sixty-one percent believed that disclosure was necessary for an accurate determination of the contested issues. Id.
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sibility of confidential therapist-patient communications arose most frequently in family law and child custody cases. 125 Interestingly, the judges in
both jurisdictions reported that they would not compel disclosure of this
information in the absence of patient consent. 126
Although the authors concluded that there is little empirical evidence
to support the proposition that a privilege is necessary for effective psychotherapy, 127 they appear to base this conclusion principally on the fact that
the respondents were either largely unaware of the privilege law within
their respective jurisdictions or misunderstood the capacity of their therapists to maintain confidentiality. 128 Additionally, even though the results
suggest that patients' self-disclosures of certain kinds of information decreased once they were informed of the lack of privilege, 129 the researchers
failed to test the effect that the level of risk of disclosure could have on
patients' self-disclosures in therapy. Without properly taking this factor into
account, their overall conclusion that the absence of a privilege will not
affect the quality of therapy appears unjustified.
Interestingly, Professor Shuman revisited the issue of the effect of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege on the therapeutic relationship following
the Supreme Court's decision in Jaffee v. Redmond.130 In his article,
Shuman noted that Jaffee appears to have a limited impact on an individual's decision to enter therapy or on the conduct of the therapy.' 3 ' However,
unlike the conclusions in his previous three studies, this time Shuman explained that Jaffee's limited impact is likely due to patients discounting the
risk of litigation or "inflating the capacity of their therapists to prevent disclosure. ' 32 He admitted that correcting these misconceptions may cause
125.
Id. at 412.
126.
Id.
127.
Id. at 417-18. They advocate for reliance on the deontological approach to privilege where intrusion into the sacredness of the psychotherapist-patient relationship is objectionable for its own sake, not because it is seen as destructive to the therapeutic relationship.
Id. at 417. They do not, however, advocate for an absolute psychotherapist-patient privilege.
Privilege Study III, supra note 107, at 417-18. Rather, they propose an interest-balancing
approach and would recognize a privilege where, considering the particular circumstances of
the case, the interest in privacy outweighs the public interest in the administration of justice.
Id. This approach was specifically rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court ten years later in
Jaffee v. Redmond. Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1996).
128.
Privilege Study III, supra note 107, at 417-18.
129.
See supra notes 107-122 and accompanying text.
130.
Daniel W. Shuman & William Foote, Jaffee v. Redmond's Impact: Life After
the Supreme Court's Recognition of a Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 30 PROF.
PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 479, 479-87 (1999).
131.
The article was co-authored by William Foote. Id. at 479.
132.
Id. at 482. The authors identified three levels of risk of disclosure. Id. at 484. In
the first level, the low end of the risk continuum, the patient seeks therapy to deal with mental health issues but is not currently involved in litigation. Id. at 484-85. Further, the issues
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patients to be less self-disclosing, which will have a resulting effect on the
33
therapeutic relationship. 1
B.

THE EVANS-MARSH STUDY

Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Jaffee v.
Redmond,134 one researcher set out to test the strength of the empirical evidence in support of the Court's findings regarding the effect of the psychotherapist-patient privilege on the therapeutic relationship, specifically
whether the existence of a privilege would affect an individual's willingness to disclose certain emotional conditions.' 35 She recruited subjects at
random and assigned them to a "privilege condition" and a "no-privilege
condition." 136 Each person was asked to complete a questionnaire that was
composed of several scenarios, each involving an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 137 Each questionnaire required the participant to
provide their opinion of the protagonists' willingness to disclose information in a different type of therapeutic setting.138 In essence, the participants
were asked to indicate how a hypothetical patient would behave under a
hypothetical set of circumstances.' 39 The scenarios included a depressed

addressed in therapy do not hint at the potential for the patient's involvement in litigation.
Id. In the middle of the risk continuum, the individual is not presently involved in litigation
but the subject matter of the therapy indicates that there is a high risk that litigation may
occur. Shuman & Foote, supra note 130, at 485. Here the authors say that the patient should
be made aware that there is a significant risk that communications between therapist and
patient may be subject to compelled disclosure. Id. They also suggest that the patient may
want to minimize disclosures that weaken the privilege claim. Id. Finally, the high end of the
risk continuum involves a situation where the individual is presently involved in litigation.
Id. at 485-86. Here, the authors suggest that the patient and therapist should consider limiting the range of issues discussed in therapy due to the risk of compelled disclosure. Id. at
485.
133.
Id.
134.
518 U.S. 1 (1996).
135.
Jennifer Evans Marsh, EmpiricalSupportfor the United States Supreme Court's
Protection of the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 13 ETmcs & BEHAV. 385 (2003). She
recruited one hundred twenty-nine people at Union Station in Washington, D.C. Id. at 38990.
136.
Id. at 388.
137.
Id. at 389.
138.
Id. at 388-89.
139.
See id. at 389. The questionnaires were of two types: the N form, in which the
communications were not privileged, and the P form, in which the communications were
privileged. Marsh, supra note 135, at 389. Participants indicated their belief as to how willing a hypothetical patient would be to disclose information about a given topic by placing a
mark along a linear analog scale. Id.
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nervosa, 14 1 a physically
and suicidal individual, 140 a patient with anorexia
143
142
abusive parent, and a sexually abusive patient.
She found statistically significant differences in the willingness to disclose among those in the "privilege condition" group compared to those in
the "no-privilege condition" group in all of the differing scenarios. 44 Based
on the results of her study, she concluded that there is strong empirical support for the Jaffee decision.145
Id. at 390. The first scenario involved a patient who was depressed and suicidal
140.
and a candidate for involuntary hospital commitment. Id. Sixty-eight percent of the participants in the privilege condition group indicated that a patient would disclose these facts
compared to seventeen percent in the no-privilege condition group. Id. at 391.
Id. The second scenario involved a patient with anorexia nervosa who starved
141.
herself to the point of requiring hospitalization. Marsh, supra note 135, at 391. Fifty-five
percent of the persons in the privilege condition group believed that patients would disclose
this information compared to nineteen in the no-privilege condition group. Id. at 391-92.
142.
Id. at 392. The third scenario involved a patient who had physically injured her
child and who was facing an upcoming child custody hearing. Id. Forty-eight percent of the
participants in the privilege condition group reported that a patient would disclose the information whereas only twelve percent in the no-privilege condition group indicated that they
thought the patient would do so. Id. at 391-92.
143.
Id. at 392. Similar findings were reported for the "sexually abusive patient scenario," where a patient had sexually abused his stepdaughter and was facing the possibility
of criminal prosecution. Marsh, supra note 135, at 392. She also included a "police officer
who shot a suspect scenario," involving a police officer who shot an allegedly armed man in
the course of apprehending him. Id. at 393. In both of these scenarios, participants in the
privilege condition group had statistically higher willingness to disclose scores than the
individuals in the no-privilege condition group. Id. at 392-93. Her results were as follows:
Suicidal patient
Gravely disabled patient
Physically abusive patient
Sexually abusive patient
Police officer

Privilege Yes
67.80
54.98
47.73
5.73
51.43

Privilege No
17.30
19.28
12.54
2.13
26.50

Id. at 391. The author notes that the results demonstrate that the privilege condition was
"more highly correlated with individuals' ratings of a hypothetical patient's willingness to
disclose than were therapy experience, demographic variables, and four dimensions of general disclosiveness (intent, amount, control of depth, honesty-accuracy)." Id. at 397. The
researcher used the general disclosiveness scales to assess a person's predisposition to disclose to others. Id. at 388-89. The demographics of the participants were as follows: 57%
were female, 43% were male, 83% were white, 8.5% were black, 4.7% were Asian, and
1.6% were Native American. Marsh, supra note 135, at 388.
144.
Id. at 391-93.
145.
Id. at 397. The author also tested whether participants with previous psychotherapy experience would have higher willingness-to-disclose scores than those without. Id.
at 387. This turned out to be untrue. See id. at 393. There were no significant differences in
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THE TAUBE AND ELWORK STUDY

Daniel Taube and Amiram Elwork set out to ascertain the circumstances under which confidentiality becomes important to patients. 146 Individual psychotherapy outpatients were ranked according to the severity of
their mental disorders 147 and placed into an "uninformed group," which was
given limited written information regarding the right to privacy and the
limits to confidentiality in psychotherapy, and an "informed" group, who
received extensive information on the current state of the law. 148 The participants were then given a questionnaire that inquired into the extent to
which they would disclose select issues that included substance abuse, harm
to self or others, socially controversial sexual practices, and abusive child
care. 1495 0None of the patients were informed that they were research participants.1
The researchers reported significant differences in the responses obtained from the informed and uninformed groups. 15 1 They found that "the
the willingness to disclose scores between those participants with previous therapy and those
without. Id.
146.
Daniel 0. Taube & Amiram Elwork, Researching the Effects of Confidentiality
Law on Patients' Self-Disclosures, 21 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 72, 72-75 (1990). The
authors note the conflicting research on the effects that confidentiality has on patients' selfdisclosures. Id. at 72. They cite the 1982 Shuman and Weiner study for the conclusion that
assurances of privacy do not have a significant effect on patients' disclosures in therapy. Id.
However, they also cite three other studies conducted between 1983 and 1987 that demonstrate the position that privacy is essential to furthering full disclosure. Id. (citing John M.
McGuire, Phillip Toal & Burton Blau, The Adult Client's Conception of Confidentiality in
the Therapeutic Relationship, 16 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 375 (1985); Thomas V.
Merluzzi & Cheryl S. Brischetto, Breach of Confidentiality and Perceived Trustworthiness
of Counselors, 30 J.COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 245 (1983); Leon VandeCreek, Russell D. Miars
& Cindy E. Herzog, Client Anticipations and Preferencesfor Confidentialityof Records, 34
J.COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 62 (1987)).

147.
Id. at 73. There were thirty-one women and eleven men ranging in age from
eighteen to seventy-four years. Id. at 72. The subjects were placed into "high" or "low"
psychopathology groups based on scores from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. Taube & Elwork, supra note 146, at 73.
148.
Id. Participants were given a written questionnaire to test their understanding
regarding the privacy instructions. Id. Both the informed and the uninformed groups averaged eighty-five percent or higher on this legal comprehension questionnaire, leading the
authors to conclude that the participants understood the information. Id.
149.
Id.
150.
Id. The researchers commented that while most of the previous studies were
based on opinion surveys or therapy simulations, this is one of the few that utilized real
patients, real clinical tasks, and real clinical materials. Taube & Elwork, supra note 146, at
73.
151.
See id. at 74. They found that the patients in the informed group admitted to
having fewer socially unacceptable sexual thoughts and behaviors and did not admit to as
many child neglect and punishment behaviors as the uninformed group. Id. The uninformed
patients who displayed high psychopathology revealed that they had thoughts about harm to
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extent to which patients are informed about the law, and the extent to which
the law is consequential for them, are . . . factors that determine whether
limitations to privacy will affect patients' self-disclosures."' 152 The authors
suggest that the results of this study have implications for the effectiveness
of current laws since the findings indicate that laws requiring the disclosure
by therapists of certain patient "confessions" may discourage patients from
being forthright, may hinder treatment, and, therefore,
may ultimately fail
153
in their intended objective of protecting society.
D.

OTHER EMPIRICAL STUDIES

The results of the Taube and Elwork study are supported by other research. One study demonstrated that the individuals in a "noconfidentiality" group provided the most socially desirable responses and
reported being the least troubled by psychopathological symptoms. 154 Conversely, subjects in a "confidentiality" condition group reported more psychological symptoms and provided fewer socially desirable responses than
the subjects in the no-confidentiality group. 155 A 1993 study conducted by
David Nowell and Jean Spruill confirmed that informing subjects about
confidentiality impacts the type of information individuals are willing to
communicate. 56 Additionally, these researchers found an overall unwillself or others more frequently than the informed group. Id. Finally, the results indicated that
the subjects in the high psychopathology/informed group disclosed a greater frequency of
substance abuse behaviors than the subjects in the other groups, which was not surprising
since disclosures about drug and alcohol abuse are legally protected. Id.
152.
Id.
153.
Taube & Elwork, supra note 146, at 73. The authors explain that the study also
demonstrates the value of professional ethical standards that require patients be fully apprised of their privacy rights before treatment commences. Id.; see also AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASS'N, supra note 100, § 4.02(a) (requiring therapists to discuss the limits of confidentiality
and the "foreseeable uses" of the information obtained in therapy).
154.
Roback & Shelton, supra note 40, at 189 (citing Robert Meyer & Deborah Willage, Confidentialityand Privileged Communication in Psychotherapy, in NEW DIRECTIONS
IN PSYCHOLEGAL RESEARCH 237-46 (Paul Lipsitt ed., 1980)).
155.
Id. The study was conducted using sixty-three undergraduate students. Id.
156.
See David Nowell & Jean Spruill, If It's Not Absolutely Confidential, Will Information Be Disclosed?, 24 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAc. 367, 368-69 (1993). The subjects were seventy-five undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory psychology class
at a southern university. Id. at 368. The participants were assigned to one of three groups and
were given a "Psychology Clinic Client Awareness Form," which provided information
about the services offered, fees, appointment cancellation policy, and limits of confidentiality. Id. All of the information was the same with the exception of the information about
confidentiality. Id. The first group was told that all the information they disclosed would be
absolutely confidential. Id. The second group was provided with some information about
confidentiality but was informed that the therapist would disclose information if he had
reason to believe the client might harm himself or others. Id. The third group was provided
with detailed information regarding other specific exceptions to confidentiality, including
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ingness to disclose aggressive
behaviors irrespective of whether they were
15 7
assured of confidentiality.
Aside from information regarding the limits of confidentiality, other
factors have been found to affect patients' self-disclosures. One study involving current psychotherapy patients found that although all of the patients considered confidentiality to be important, inpatients were more concerned about violations of the confidentiality rules than outpatients.158 Another study demonstrated that the level of concern over potential breaches
of confidentiality varied according to the recipient of the information, with
eighty percent of the adult patients indicating that they would be
angry if
59
their psychological information was released to their employers. 1
Unique issues arise in the case of mandatory reporting statutes, particularly in situations involving suspected instances of child abuse and neglect, t 6 where a therapist may be required by law to report confidential
patient communications. Although these issues involve a breach of professional ethics rather than the abrogation of a privilege, they confirm the imsuspected child abuse and court subpoenas. Nowell & Spruill, supra at 368. The subjects
were then given a questionnaire designed to assess their willingness to disclose information
about a variety of clinical concerns, including depression, substance abuse, physical aggression, suicidal thought, and psychotic thoughts and behaviors. Id.
157.
Id. at 369. The study also found that participants were more willing to disclose
information about aggressive thoughts than suicidal thoughts, while they were less willing to
disclose information regarding substance abuse than depression. Id. at 368.
158.
Roback & Shelton, supra note 40, at 187 (citing John M. McGuire et al., The
Adult Client's Conception of Confidentiality in the Therapeutic Relationship, 16 PROF.
PSYCHOL. 375 (1985)). This study employed a survey of fifty psychotherapy outpatients and
twenty-six nonpsychotic psychiatry inpatients at a regional medical center. John M.
McGuire et al., The Adult Client's Conception of Confidentiality in the Therapeutic Relationship, 16 PROF. PSYCHOL. 375, 377-78 (1985). The authors suggest that since inpatients
tend to be more ill than outpatients, they would have more to fear if word of their condition
was made public. Id. at 380.
159. Id. (citing Donald Schmid et al., Confidentiality in Psychiatry: A Study of the
Patient's View, 34 HOSP. COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 353 (1983) (noting that only forty percent of the patients felt strongly about the release of this information to members of their
family)).
160. It is mandatory in every state to report suspected cases of child abuse and neglect. Margaret Meriwether, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: Time for a Change, 20 FAM. L.Q.
141, 142 (1986). Although each state has a mandatory reporting statute for child abuse and
neglect, there is a lack of uniform treatment. Karen L. Ross, Revealing ConfidentialSecrets:
Will It Save Our Children, 28 SETON HALL L. REv. 963, 966 (1998). Mandatory reporting
laws abrogate the professional duty to maintain confidentiality imbedded in the various
professional codes of ethics. Id. Typical statutes will include a definition of reportable conditions, the persons required to report abuse, the level of certainty required before a report is
made, a description of the sanctions for failure to report, immunity provisions, and the abrogation of certain privileges. Id. Most states require reporting by persons engaged in the
health, education, social work, and law enforcement professions. Id. at 967. Some but not all
states require clergy to report suspected child abuse and neglect. Id.
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portance of confidentiality in the therapist-patient relationship. In a study
conducted at the Johns Hopkins Sexual Disorders Clinic, the researchers
concluded that mandatory reporting laws dissuade undetected abusers from
entering treatment.
This was based on a severe drop in the number of
instances of self-reported child sexual abuse after the State of Maryland
implemented mandatory reporting statutes requiring psychotherapists to
report suspected cases of child abuse. 162 In another study, researchers also
found that more than twenty-five percent of patients terminated their therapy immediately following a report made by their therapist. 163 Additionally,
the therapists reported that the patients who remained in therapy following
a mandated report went through a164period of mistrust and resistance that, in
some cases, was never overcome.
In summary, these studies provide ample empirical evidence in support of the necessity for the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Although
Shuman initially reached an opposite conclusion, his early conclusion appears to be based principally on the fact that patients and lay persons alike
were either largely unaware of the existence of privilege statutes or had an
161.
Fred S. Berlin et al., Effects of Statutes Requiring Psychiatrists to Report Suspected Sexual Abuse of Children, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 449, 452 (1991) ("[Mandatory
reporting] appears to have deterred honest disclosure by patients in treatment and to have
deterred unidentified potential patients from entering treatment.").
162.
Id. at 451.
163.
Murray Levine, A Therapeutic JurisprudenceAnalysis of Mandated Reporting
of Child Maltreatment by Psychotherapists, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 711, 730 (1993)
(citing Holly Watson & Murray Levine, Psychotherapy and Mandated Reporting of Child
Abuse, 59 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 246, 252-53 (1989)). This number does not reflect the
number of clients who psychologically dropout but cannot physically terminate therapy
because they are embroiled in child protection or criminal justice systems. Holly Watson &
Murray Levine, Psychotherapy and Mandated Reporting of Child Abuse, 59 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 246, 254 (1989). The problem is compounded when a mandated report is
ultimately determined to be unsubstantiated. Levine, supra at 726-27. Sixty-six percent of
reports to child protection agencies are unsubstantiated. Id. at 726. State mandatory reporting
statutes generally require a person to report based upon a "reasonable suspicion" of harm.
See id. at 718.
164.
Roback & Shelton, supra note 40, at 188. Even mere knowledge of reportable
offenses was found to result in reluctance on the part of patients to discuss violent tendencies. Murray Levine et al., Paper Presentation at the Annual Meeting of American Psychological Association: Mandated Reporting and the TherapeuticAlliance in the Context of the
Child Protection System (Aug. 1991). One-quarter of responding psychotherapists reported
reluctance on the part of their patients to discuss violent tendencies after the patients had
been informed about reportable offenses, which indicates that patient concerns over confidentiality affected the therapeutic relationship. Toni P. Wise, Where the Public Peril Begins:
A Survey of Psychotherapiststo Determine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REv. 165
(1978). Furthermore, clients' knowledge of the limits of confidentiality was found to result
in a severe decrease in disclosures of instances of child abuse. Levine, supra note 163, at
725 (citing Fred S. Berlin et al., Effects of Statutes Requiring Psychiatrists to Report Suspected Sexual Abuse of Children, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 449, 451 (1991)).
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erroneous understanding of the ability of a therapist to prevent disclosure of
confidential information. Other studies, however, have clearly demonstrated
that a patient's willingness to self-disclose sensitive information is significantly higher once they are informed that a psychotherapist-patient privilege exists. Conversely, patient self-disclosures and their willingness to
continue in therapy are especially low when the risk of disclosure by the
therapist of confidential information is high, as evidenced in the Johns
Hopkins study.
IV.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

AND THE USE OF THERAPIST TESTIMONY IN SELECTING JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS
A.

EXCEPTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

Following Jaffee v. Redmond, 165 every jurisdiction now recognizes
some form of privilege for patient communications made in conjunction
with mental health treatment. 166 However, the present legal framework fails
to provide strong or consistent protection for these confidential communications. Many federal circuit courts have carved out exceptions to this privilege even though the Supreme Court refused to recognize any specific exceptions in Jaffee. In the states, the law of privilege is riddled with exceptions and has been described as a "crazy quilt pattern of legislation across
the country"' 67 where social policy goals, professional ethics, and legal requirements are all at odds with each other.
Many federal courts have recognized a patient-litigant exception to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, 68 which was provided for in proposed
Federal Rule of Evidence 504(d)(3). The proposed rule crafted an exception
for "communications relevant to an issue of the mental or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which he relies upon the condition
as an element of his claim or defense."' 69 The majority of federal cases interpreting Jaffee have involved this exception,170 which arises most frequently in claims in civil cases for emotional distress purportedly the result

518 U.S. 1 (1996).
165.
166.
Harriet L. Glosoff et al., Privileged Communication in the Counselor-Client
Relationship, 78 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 454 (2000).
Id. at 455. The authors present a table of exceptions to the privilege by state and
167.
the District of Columbia. I at 458.
Melisa L. Nelken, The Limits of Privilege: The Developing Scope of Federal
168.
Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege Law, 20 REv. LMG. 1, 19 (2000).

Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183,
169.
241 (1972).
170.
Nelken, supra note 168, at 20.
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of the defendant's conduct. 17 1 Many of the courts that have considered the
patient-litigant exception have defined it broadly, finding the exception
applies whenever a plaintiff alleges emotional distress irrespective of
whether the party plans to introduce expert testimony evidence at trial.' 7 2
Other more-cautious courts, however, have held that the mere allegation of
emotional distress is not enough to trigger the exception.1 73 Instead, the
privilege remains intact until the party takes affirmative
steps to use the
74
privileged material in furtherance of their case. 1
There is a current split of authority over whether federal courts should
recognize a dangerous person exception to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege based on the duty that was originally set forth in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California. 75 Tarasoff requires mental health
professionals to warn third parties of threats that are made by a patient in
therapy. 76 The Tenth and Fifth Circuits 7 7 have allowed the exception,
whereas the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have not.' 78 The Tenth
Circuit was the
79
question.
this
examine
to
Jaffee
after
court
federal
first
United States v. Glass involved a defendant, Archie Monroe Glass,
who was voluntarily admitted to the mental health unit at Hillcrest Hospital
in February 1996.180 During his stay, he told his psychotherapist, Dr. Sharntharam Darbe, that he "wanted to get in the history books like Hinkley [sic]

171.
Id. at 21; see also In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2008) (failing to recognize
the exception); Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2006) (recognizing the exception); Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2000); Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225 (D. Mass. 1997).
172. Nelken, supra note 168, at 21 n.88 (citing Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n v. Danka Indus., Inc., 990 F. Supp 1138, 1142 (E.D. Mont. 1997)).
173. Nelken, supra note 168, at 25 n.106 (citing Booker v. City of Boston, Nos. 97CV-12534-MEL, 97-CV-12675-MEL, 1999 WL 734644, at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 10, 1999)).
174. Id. (citing Booker v. City of Boston, Nos. 97-CV-12534-MEL, 97-CV-12675MEL, 1999 WL 734644, at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 10, 1999)).
175. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
176. See id. at 342-48.
177. See United States v. Auster, 517 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding the privilege
did not apply where the circumstances demonstrate that the patient did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy when his statements were made); United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d
1356 (10th Cir. 1998) (recognizing the exception but refusing to apply it where there was no
showing of the need for the evidence).
178.
See United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2000). In United States v.
Chase, the court refused to apply the exception, stating, "[t]here is not necessarily a connection between the goals of protection and proof." 340 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2003). It noted
that if a patient is dangerous at the time of the required disclosure but stable and harmless at
the time of trial, "the protection rationale that animates the exception to the states' confidentiality laws no longer applies." Id.
179. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356.
180. Id. at 1357.
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and wanted to shoot Bill Clinton and Hilary [sic]." 18' Defendant was
charged with knowingly and willfully
threatening to kill the President in
182
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871(a).
The defendant moved to exclude Dr. Darbe's statement on the ground
that it was protected from disclosure by the psychotherapist-patient privilege as set forth in Jaffee.183 Although the court appeared willing to recognize the exception, it applied a case by case balancing test in which it
weighed the public good served when communications of this nature are
protected from disclosure against the need for the evidence.' 84 It refused to
allow the exception in the case at hand because it '1found
that the govern85
ment had not shown a "significant evidentiary need."
This issue was addressed two years later by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in United States v. Hayes. 86 The defendant, Roy Lee Hayes, an
employee of the U.S. Postal Service, was charged with threatening to murder a federal official, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 115,187 resulting from disclo181.
Id.
182.
Id. The government argued that the statement was not protected by the privilege
but, rather, that it fell within the exception Justice Stevens set forth in footnote nineteen of
the opinion, which provides:
Although it would be premature to speculate about most future
developments in the federal psychotherapist privilege, we do
not doubt that there are situations in which the privilege must
give way, for example, if a serious threat of harm to the patient
or to others can be averted only by means of a disclosure by
the therapist.
Id. (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1996)).
183.
Id.
184.
Glass, 133 F.3d at 1359.
185.
Id. The government had argued for the extension of the court's holding in
United States v. Burtrum to the present case. Id. (citing United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d
1299 (10th Cir. 1994)). The court distinguished Burtrum on the grounds that Burtrum was a
pre-Jaffee case and that it "addressed only the narrow issue [of] whether to recognize the
privilege in a criminal child sexual abuse context." Id. The Burtrum court held that a balancing test was required in order to protect "this vulnerable segment of society," concluding
"'that significant evidentiary need compels the admission of this type of relevant evidence in
child sexual abuse prosecutions."' Id. at 1356-60 (quoting United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d
1299, 1302 (10th Cir. 1994)). Finally, the court noted that it had also recognized an exception to the marital communications privilege in cases involving child abuse. Id. at 1359. That
is, a subset of the public good, the welfare of children, presented the sort of situation Jaffee
anticipated. Glass, 133 F.3d at 1360 (citing United States v. Bahe, 128 F.3d 1440 (9th Cir.
1997)). It remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the threat "was serious when it was uttered and whether its disclosure was the only means of averting harm to
the President when the disclosure was made." Id.
186.
United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2000).
187.
18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(b) (2000) ("Whoever... threatens to assault, kidnap, or
murder, a United States official.., with intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with such
official ... while engaged in the performance of official duties, or with intent to retaliate
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sures he made during a therapy session in 1998, which, "outlined in great
detail," his plan to kill his supervisor, Veda Odle.'8 8 Hayes motioned to
suppress the production of his therapist's records and to exclude his therapist's testimony on the ground that both were privileged. 89 9The
district
0
court agreed, and the Sixth Circuit Court affirmed the decision.'
The Sixth Circuit began its discussion by distinguishing the state law
Tarasoff duty-to-warn requirement from the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 91 It noted the lack of a connection between a therapist's duty to notify
a third person of a patient's threat to harm him and the psychotherapistpatient privilege, which serves to prohibit a therapist from testifying about
92
the threat in a subsequent prosecution of the patient arising from the act.'
The court explained that the Tarasoff duty serves a more immediate function than the dangerous patient exception and noted that the likelihood of
the threat being carried out greatly diminishes, if not evaporates, once court
proceedings have begun. 193 The court held:
[T]he federal psychotherapist/patient privilege does not
impede a psychotherapist's compliance with his professional and ethical duty to protect innocent third parties, a
duty which may require, among other things, disclosure to
third parties or testimony at an involuntary hospitalization
proceeding. Conversely, compliance with the professional
duty to protect does not imply a duty to testify against a patient in criminal proceedings or in civil proceedings other
against such official . . . on account of the performance of official duties, shall be punished.").
188.
Hayes, 227 F.3d at 580. On the evening of March 31, 1998, Hayes participated
in a therapy session with James Edward Van Dyke, a social worker at the Veteran's Center.
Id. He described the layout of her home and explained that he knew when she would be at
home alone. Id.
189.
Id. at 581.
190.
Id. at 587. The government argued that the information was admissible under
the exception set forth in footnote nineteen of the Jaffee opinion. Id. at 584. The district
court ordered the suppression of Van Dyke's testimony and Hayes's medical records and
dismissed the case. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 581.
191.
Id. at 583.
192.
Id.
193.
Id. at 584. The court noted the paradox involved in cases such as these. Id. Although Hayes should be applauded for seeking therapy for his psychotic delusions, he is
subject to criminal prosecution because his therapists are required to testify against him. Id.
Addressing the questions raised by footnote nineteen in the Jaffee opinion, the Sixth Circuit
believed that this was intended as a means of assuring that the privilege will not operate to
impede a therapist's compliance with the duty to protect third persons from harm and recognized the need for therapists to testify in certain court proceedings, such as those for involuntary commitment of a patient, as part of their duty to protect third persons. Hayes, 227 F.3d
at 585-86.
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than directly related to the patient's involuntary hospitalization, and such testimony is privileged and inadmissible if
a patient
properly asserts the psychotherapist/patient privi194
lege.
B.

EXCEPTIONS IN THE STATE COURTS

The trend among the states has been to extend the psychotherapistpatient privilege to a wide variety of mental health professionals while limiting its use through the creation of numerous exceptions. 95 The dangerous
patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege has been recognized in Florida and California. 196 California has statutorily recognized this
exception and requires therapists to disclose dangerous patients to authorities or intended victims
and allows them to testify to threats made during
97
the course of therapy.
Twenty jurisdictions recognize the exceptions contained in proposed
rule 504 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 98 In these states, communications between therapists and patients in court proceedings requiring hospitalization, communications during a court-ordered examination of the mental or emotional condition of the patient, or communications when the mental or emotional condition of the patient is an element of a claim or defense

194.
Id. at 586. The court also addressed the question of whether Hayes had waived
the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Id. The government argued that Hayes's continued
communications made after he was informed by the therapist that he would need to disclose
Hayes's threats constituted a waiver of the testimonial privilege-the majority was unconvinced. Id. It noted: "It is one thing to inform a patient of the 'duty to protect'; it is quite
another to advise a patient that his 'trusted' confidant may one day assist in procuring his
conviction and incarceration." Id. Since none of his therapists had advised him that they
might testify against him, he could not have made a knowing and voluntary waiver of the
privilege. Id. at 586-87.
195.
Glosoff et al., supra note 166, at 455.
196.
CAL. EvD. CODE § 1024 (West 1995) ("There is no privilege under this article if
the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe that the patient is in such mental or emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself or to the person or property of another and that
disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent the threatened danger."). Florida
also appears to recognize this exception. See Guerrier v. State, 811 So. 2d 852, 856 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2002) ("[T]he Legislature intended to allow admission of the psychiatrist's
testimony in a subsequent prosecution of the dangerous patient for offenses committed
against the victim.").
197.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024.
198.
Karen L. Ross, Revealing Confidential Secrets: Will It Save Our Children?, 28
STETSON L. REv. 963, 971 (2000).
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are not privileged. 199 Virtually all states have exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege in cases involving child abuse and neglect.2 °
One study reports that the most frequently cited to the least frequently
cited exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege are:
(a) in cases involving a dispute between counselor and client; (b) when a client raises the issue of mental condition in
legal proceedings; (c) when a client's condition poses a
danger to self or others; (d) in cases involving child abuse
or neglect (in addition to mandated reporting laws); (e)
when the counselor has knowledge that the client is contemplating the commission of a crime; (f) in cases involving court ordered psychological evaluations; (g) in cases
involving involuntary hospitalization proceedings; (h)
when the counselor has knowledge that a client has been
the victim of a crime; and (i) in cases involving harm to
vulnerable adults.2 °1
Some states employ very broad and generalized exceptions to the
privilege, abrogating the privilege when the confidential information is "essential to the court proceeding,'' 20 2 or when "disclosure is necessary to a
proper administration of justice. 2 °3
C.

EXCEPTIONS IN CHILD CUSTODY CASES

The best interest of the child standard is the generally accepted standard applied by courts to resolve child custody disputes resulting from the
dissolution of a marriage. 204 The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act has
had an important influence on the statutes of many jurisdictions. Section
402 of the Act speaks to the best interest of the child and provides:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the
best interest of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
199.
241 (1972).
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
rights cases

Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183,
Glosoff et al., supra note 166, at 456.
Id. at 455.
See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 330-A: 19 (LexisNexis 2003).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.3 (2007).
The best interest of the child also comes into play in termination of parental
stemming from allegations of child abuse and neglect. See Deborah Paruch, The

Orphaning of UnderprivilegedChildren: America's Failed Child Welfare Law & Policy, 8
J.L. & FAM. STUD. 119, 148-63 (2006).
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(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his
custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child
with his parent or parents, his siblings, and any other
person who may significantly affect the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school and
community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his relationship to the child.20 5
205.

UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 402 (1973). Many other states' statutes

include other factors for the courts' consideration, including "the capacity and disposition of
the parties involved to give the child love, affection and guidance." See, e.g., MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 722.23 (West 2002). Section 722.23 of the Michigan Code sets out the following factors to be considered:
As used in this act, "best interests of the child" means the sum total of
the following factors to be considered, evaluated, and determined by the
court:

(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between
the parties involved and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the
child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education
and raising of the child in his or her religion or creed, if any.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide
the child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care
recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of
medical care, and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory
environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed
custodial home or homes.
(f) The moral fitness of the parties involved.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the
child to be of sufficient age to express preference.
(j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and
encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between
the child and the other parent, or the child and the parents.
(k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed against or witnessed by the child.
(1) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child custody dispute.
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This standard, under which a wide array of evidence may be relevant,
has led to a tradition of liberal admissibility of evidence in child custody
proceedings. °6 Accordingly, family court judges presiding over disputed
child custody actions frequently order disclosure of confidential information obtained in psychotherapy on the grounds that it is helpful in determining the best interest of the child. 207 This evidence comes in through the admission of patient treatment records or the compelled testimony of the treating therapist. 20 8 Additionally, judges will often order psychological evaluations of the parties. 209 However, since court-ordered evaluations are not
treatment and are performed with the understanding that the results of the
evaluation will be provided to the court, they are not subject to the psychotherapist-patient privilege on the grounds that there is no expectation of
confidentiality.21 0
Not all courts automatically abrogate the psychotherapist-patient privilege in child custody actions, although the protection of this privilege varies
among jurisdictions. In Kinsella v. Kinsella,21' the Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that the psychotherapist-patient privilege should be pierced only
in the most compelling of circumstances. 212 It ruled that the proponent of
the evidence must demonstrate a legitimate need for the evidence and that
the evidence is both relevant and material to the question before the
court.21 3 The proponent must also demonstrate, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the information cannot be obtained from other less-intrusive
sources. 214 In this case, which involved allegations of domestic violence
and substance abuse, the trial court found that the husband's admissions to
his therapist were relevant and material to the issues before the court.21 5
206.

AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, TASK FORCE REPORT 31: DISCLOSURE OF PSYCHIATRIC

215.

Id at 583-84.

TREATMENT RECORDS IN CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES 1 (1991), available at
http://archive.psych.org/edu/other-res/libarchives/archives/tfr/TFR31 .pdf.
207.
Id.
208.
Id.
209.
Id. at 4.
210.
See, e.g., In re Alethea W., 747 A.2d 736, 739 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (explaining that since court ordered psychological examinations are performed for the benefit of
the court and not the individual and with the understanding that no privilege of confidentiality applies, the purpose of the privilege, which is to aid in providing effective treatment by
encouraging free and open communication between the therapist and the patient, is not
served and, accordingly, does not apply).
211.
Kinsella v. Kinsella, 696 A.2d 556 (N.J. 1997); see also In re Matthew R., 688
A.2d 955, 962 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) ("The benefits to society of having confidential
and privileged treatment available to troubled parents far outweighs the limitations placed
upon the court by not having such information revealed.").
212.
Kinsella, 696 A.2d at 584.
213.
Id. at 572.
214.
Id.
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However, the supreme court reversed and remanded the case to the trial
court to consider whether other sources of information were available to
allow for proper adjudication of the child custody matter without disclosure
of the father's therapy records.216 It noted:
Made public and taken out of context, the disclosure of
notes from therapy sessions could have devastating personal consequences for the patient and his or her family,
and the threat of such disclosure could be wielded to unfairly influence settlement negotiations or the course of
litigation. Especially in the context of matrimonial litigation, the value of the therapist-patient relationship and of
the patient's privacy is intertwined with one of the most
important concerns of the courts-the safety and wellbeing of children and families. Therefore, only in the most
compelling circumstances should the courts permit the
privilege to be pierced.217
Many jurisdictions apply a case by case balancing approach in which
the policies in favor of the privilege are weighed against the need for disclosure.2 18 Massachusetts provides for the abrogation of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The Massachusetts statute provides, in relevant part:
In any case involving child custody . . .in which ... the
judge, in the exercise of his discretion, determines that the
psychotherapist has evidence bearing significantly on the
patient's ability to provide suitable care or custody, and
that it is more important to the welfare of the child that the
communication be disclosed than that the relationship between patient and psychotherapist be protected.219
Sometimes the decision to abrogate the privilege occurs only after a court's
in camera review of the evidence for relevancy.2 2 °
216.
ld. at 584.
217.
Id.
218.
See Von Goyt v. State Dept. of Pensions and Sec., 461 So. 2d 821, 823 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1984) ("[Where a] proper resolution of a child custody issue requires disclosure of
privileged medical records, the psychologist-patient privilege must yield."); Cabrera v.
Cabrera, 580 A.2d 1227, 1233 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990) (stating that the party seeking admission of evidence subject to the psychotherapist-patient privilege must demonstrate to the
court that justice requires admission of the evidence).
219.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20B(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2009).
220.
See, e.g., Morey v. Peppin, 353 N.W.2d 179, 183 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (noting
that before disclosing therapy records, the court is required to review the records in camera
in order "to prevent disclosures that are irrelevant to the custody question or otherwise an-
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Conversely, some jurisdictions offer little protection for the psychotherapist-patient privilege in child custody cases, setting the threshold for
piercing the psychotherapist-patient privilege extraordinarily low. These
jurisdictions, which include Indiana, Louisiana, and Kentucky, have held
that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is waived once a parent petitions
for custody of children in a divorce action. 22' Other jurisdictions, such as
Missouri, abrogate the privilege in child custody actions once allegations of
child abuse or neglect are made.222
The reliance that family court judges frequently place on psychological evidence in child custody matters is demonstrated by recent studies. One
study asked judges to rank the importance of eleven different types of evidence in disputed child custody cases on a scale of one to nine.2 23 The results show that the judges considered testimony or reports from a courtappointed psychologist as one of the most important sources of information,
rating it a 6.49, or the fourth most important out of the eleven items.22 4 Only
the desires of older children, court ordered custody investigation reports,
and the testimony of the parties were given higher values.225 The judges
found this psychological evidence to have greater value than the testimony
of school personnel, the desires of younger children, or the testimony of
noying, embarrassing, oppressive, or unduly burdensome"), rev'd on other grounds, 375
N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1985).
See, e.g., Owen v. Owen, 563 N.E.2d 605 (Ind. 1990); Atwood v. Atwood, 550
221.
S.W.2d 465 (Ky. 1976); Kirkley v. Kirkley, 575 So. 2d 509 (La. Ct. App. 1991). But see
Clark v. Clark, 371 N.W.2d 749 (Neb. 1985) (stating that since seeking custody "does not
result in making relevant the information contained in the file cabinets of every psychiatrist
who has ever treated the litigant," a court must review evidence in camera for relevance
before disclosure).
222.
Gale Humphrey Carpenter, Overriding the Psychologist-Client Privilege in
Child Custody Disputes: Are Anyone's Best Interests Being Served?, 68 UMKC L. REv.
169, 170 (1999).
223.
Thomas J. Reidy, Richard M. Silver & Alan Carlson, Child Custody Decisions:
A Survey of Judges, 23 FAM. L.Q. 75 (1989). The researchers distributed questionnaires to
superior court judges in the State of California. Id. at 76. One hundred fifty-six responses
were received. Id. The questionnaire covered several aspects of a child custody dispute,
including sources of evidence. Id. at 78. The types of evidence the judges were asked to rank
were: (1) the desires of children, age 15; (2) custody investigation reports; (3) testimony of
the parties; (4) reports from court-appointed psychologists; (5) testimony of school personnel; (6) the desires of children, age 10; (7) reports from psychologists retained by a party; (8)
testimony of extended family members; (9) recommendations of attorneys; (10) testimony of
friends; and (11) the desires of children, age 5. Id. at 78-79 & tbl.2. In addition to courtappointed psychologists, judges considered the testimony of the parties and the wishes of
older children as the most important sources of information. Id. at 78. The judges gave the
highest rating, 7.33, to the desires of children over the age of 15 and the lowest rating, 4.79,
to the desires of children age 5 and under. Reidy, Silver & Carlson, supra at 79 tbl.2.
224.
Id.
225.
Id.
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extended family members or friends.226 The judges also considered psychological testimony from a therapist employed by one of the parents to have
greater value than the recommendations of attorneys or the testimony of
extended family members or friends.2 27
Shuman and Weiner also reported on the significant reliance that
judges place on psychological evidence in family law cases. 228 They reported that the judges responding to their questionnaires indicated that testimony from psychologists was most frequently sought in family law
cases.2 29 This may be due to the fact that the stakes are high in these types
of proceedings. In fact, judges reported that there is no more difficult decision to make than one involving a child custody determination.23 °
Responding to the growing trend of the use of psychological evidence
by family court judges, the American Psychiatric Association formed a task
force to study the practice of judicially compelled disclosure of this type of
information in child custody disputes. Its report, entitled Disclosure of Psychiatric Treatment Records in Child Custody Disputes, was issued in
1991.23 The association recommends that courts draw a "sharp distinction.
. .between the typical divorce custody proceeding and the relatively uncommon divorce case in which a parent's capacity to care adequately for
226. Id.
227.
Id. The overall ratings of the judges, on a scale of one to nine, with nine meaning "extremely important" and one meaning "not at all important," were as follows:
*
Desires of children, age 15 - 7.33
*
Custody investigation reports - 6.87
*
Testimony of the parties - 6.60
*
Court-appointed psychologists - 6.49
*
Testimony of school personnel - 5.45
"
Desires of children, age 10-4.79
"
Psychologists retained by one attorney - 4.50
*
Testimony of extended family - 4.37
"
Recommendations of attorneys - 3.94
*
Testimony of friends - 3.92
*
Desires of children, age 5 - 2.82
Id. The authors comment that this difference may be attributable to differing theoretical
approaches to child custody determinations. Reidy, Silver & Carlson, supra note 223, at 79.
They note that mental health professionals who differ in their opinions may be viewed as
"hired guns" when their differences are actually the result of "honest theoretical disputes."
Id. at 80. The authors suggest that judges be better educated regarding the differing theoretical approaches to child custody determinations along with recent research findings. Id.
228.
Privilege Study I, supra note 107, at 927; Privilege Study III, supra note 107, at
409,411.
229. Privilege Study I, supra note 107, at 927; Privilege Study III, supra note 107, at
409,411.
230.
Reidy, Silver & Carlson, supra note 223, at 75.
231. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 206, at 1.
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the child because of 'emotional instability' is at issue., 232 The association
opposes any judicially compelled disclosure of confidential information
obtained in psychotherapy in child custody actions absent a finding that a
parent that has received psychotherapy is currently unable to provide adequate care for the child. 233 This initial finding must be supported by substantial, "reliable independent evidence of [mental or emotional] impairment., 234 The association suggests that courts consider the following criteria in evaluating whether the disclosure of this confidential information will
assist the court in rendering a decision as to the parent's ability to adequately care for the child: (1) the gravity of the psychiatric disorder and the
type of treatment, (2) the "recency/chronicity" of the treatment, and (3)
whether the information can be obtained from other
sources, including a
23 5
court-ordered evaluation by an independent therapist.
Other questions arise regarding the use of psychological evidence in
child custody determinations independent of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. These concerns principally focus on the reliability of this type of
social science evidence. One major concern centers on the use of the best
interest of the child standard and the lack of empirical findings in support of
it. Some authors contend that empirical findings on the best interest of the
child are "nonexistent. 2 36 Other commentators have criticized the use of
various forms of psychological evidence on the grounds that it falls far
short of the current requirements for expert evidence set forth in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.237 and its progeny.2 38 Nonetheless,
232.
Id.
233.
Id. at 3.
234.
Id. at 4.
235.
Id. at 3-4.
236.
Sheila Rush Okpaku, Psychology: Impediment or Aid in Child Custody Cases?,
29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1117, 1140 (1976). However, as one author put it, the best interest test
assumes that mental health professionals have a reliable basis for deciding these questions
that judges and attorneys lack. Daniel W. Shuman, What Should We Permit Mental Health
Professionalsto Say About "The Best Interests of the Child"?: An Essay on Common Sense,
Daubert, and the Rules of Evidence, 31 FAM. L.Q. 551, 565-66 (1997).
237.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert requires
courts serve a "gatekeeping role" when determining whether to admit expert evidence. Id. at
597. Courts are required to examine the validity or reliability of the evidence, the degree to
which the evidence "fits" the facts and issues of the case, and whether the evidence will
confuse the issues or mislead the jury. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 2, § 7.17, at
652. In determining whether the expert evidence is reliable, the Daubert Court instructed
lower courts to consider: (1) whether the evidence has been subjected to peer review, (2)
whether the technique or theory has been tested, (3) error rates, and (4) the degree of acceptance in the scientific community. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. These are not all-inclusive
factors, but they serve as a guideline for the trial courts. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra
note 2, § 7.17, at 653.
In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,the Court held that Daubert was not limited
to scientific evidence but applies to all forms of expert testimony. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). The
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judges freely welcome these experts' advice and recommendations and
routinely request that mental health professionals render opinions on the
ultimate issue in child custody proceedings.23 9
D.

EXCEPTIONS IN CHILD PROTECTION PROCEEDINGS

All of the concerns addressed above with respect to child custody determinations are present in proceedings involving the termination of parental rights, but to a much greater extent. Mental health professionals are routinely asked to testify in these proceedings and are asked to render an opinion on the ultimate issues in the case-whether the parent is afit parent and
whether it would be in the best interest of the child for parental rights to be
terminated. 240

Court further instructed that lower courts have "broad latitude" not just in determining
whether evidence is reliable but also in deciding "how to determine reliability." Id. at 152.
238.
Professor Shuman challenges decisions that have held it to be appropriate to
apply less-rigorous standards in scrutinizing behavioral or social science evidence because
its knowledge base is less exacting. Shuman, supra note 236, at 559-64. He notes that the
logic is "curious, at best," and he argues that lowering the bar for admissibility of this type
of evidence "demeans the knowledge base of the entirety of behavioral and social sciences
and accepts wholesale the criticism that they are soft science." Id. at 563. He further argues
that this approach ignores or demeans the rigorous research that is conducted in the fields of
psychology or psychiatry. Id. For an excellent discussion and analysis of social science
research and the family law field, see Sarah H. Ramsey & Robert F. Kelly, Social Science
Knowledge in Family Law Cases: JudicialGate-Keeping in the Daubert Era, 59 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1 (2004). An example of what some would refer to as "junk science" in the courtroom
is the case where a mother lost custody of her children in a disputed custody action because
the court relied upon the testimony of a mental health professional who was allowed to opine
that there was a "statistical probability" that her "own emotional trauma and victimization
could be projected onto the children." See Branson v. Branson, 411 N.W.2d 395, 400 (N.D.
1987).
239.
A survey of Michigan judges demonstrated that eighty-four percent of the
judges believed that custody evaluators should give recommendations to the court. James N.
Bow & Francella A. Quinnell, Critique of Child Custody Evaluations by the Legal Profession, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 115, 121 (2004). This is in contrast to the view of mental health
professionals who uniformly believe that they should refrain from rendering opinions on the
ultimate issue in a case. GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE
COuRTs: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS & LAWYERS § 1.04, at 17 (2d
ed. 1997).
240.
See infra notes 284-88 and accompanying text; see also In re Hamlet, 571
N.W.2d 750, 754 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (recounting the testimony of mental health professionals and their opinions as to the ultimate issue in the case), rev'd on other grounds, In re
Trejo, 612 N.W.2d 407 (Mich. 2000).
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All fifty states recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege, 24' though
it is routinely abrogated in these child protection proceedings. Many states,
including New York, Florida, and California, abrogate the privilege completely in child protection proceedings. 242 Other states, such as Maryland,
appear to draw a distinction between court ordered psychological evaluations and other treatment, abrogating the privilege in the former instance
provided the communications are made by the patient after being informed
of the absence of a privilege in the course of a court-ordered examination.243 Alaska follows the Maryland approach and abrogates the privilege
in child protection proceedings but only as to court ordered psychological
evaluations. 2 " In State v. R.H.,24 5 the Alaska Court of Appeals explained:

Harriet L. Glosoff, Barbara Herlihy & E. Berton Spence, Privileged Communi241.
cation in the Counselor-ClientRelationship,78 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 454, 458 (2000). The
authors also provide a chart that identifies the exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege in all fifty states. Id.
242.
See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(3)(h) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2009)
("In any proceeding brought upon a ground set forth in paragraph (c) of subdivision four,
neither the privilege attaching to confidential communications between husband and wife, as
set forth in section forty-five hundred two of the civil practice law and rules, nor the physician-patient and related privileges, as set forth in section forty-five hundred four of the civil
practice law and rules, nor the psychologist-client privilege, as set forth in section forty-five
hundred seven of the civil practice law and rules, nor the social worker-client privilege, as
set forth in section forty-five hundred eight of the civil practice law and rules, shall be a
ground for excluding evidence which otherwise would be admissible."); E.H. v. Dep't of
Health & Rehab. Serv., 443 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (interpreting the statute
as abrogating the privilege); see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 1012 (West 1995) (permitting disclosure of communications between psychotherapists and patients to "those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for ... the accomplishment of the purpose for which the psychotherapist is consulted"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.459.4 (West 2004) (recognizing only the
priest-penitent and attorney-client privilege in termination of parental rights proceedings).
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-109 (LexisNexis 2006) ("Unless other243.
wise provided, in all judicial, legislative, or administrative proceedings, a patient or the
patient's authorized representative has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent a
witness from disclosing ... [c]ommunications relating to diagnosis or treatment of the patient['s mental or emotional disorder] .... There is no privilege if... [a] judge finds that the
patient, after being informed there will be no privilege, makes communications in the course
of an examination ordered by the court and the issue at trial involves his mental or emotional
disorder .... "); see also In re Alethea W., 747 A.2d 736, 739 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000)
(explaining that since court ordered psychological services are performed for the benefit of
the court and not the individual, the purpose of the privilege, which is to aid in providing
effective treatment, is not served).
244.
ALASKA R. EvD. 504(d)(5)-(6) (providing exceptions to the physician-patient
and psychotherapist-patient privileges). Alaska Rule of Evidence 504(d) states, in relevant
part:
(d) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule:
(5) Required Report. As to information that the physician or psychotherapist or the patient is required to report to a public em-
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In a court ordered examination, the relationship is likely to be an arm's length one though not
necessarily so. In any event, an exception is necessary for the effective utilization of this important
and growing procedure. When the psychotherapist
is appointed by the court, it is most often for the
purpose of having the psychotherapist testify concerning his conclusions as to the patient's condition ....

The exception, it will be observed, deals

with a court ordered examination rather than with a
court appointed physician or psychotherapist. Also,
the exception is effective only with respect to the
particular purpose for which the examination is ordered.246

Wisconsin does not recognize an exception to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege in proceedings involving termination of parental rights.24 7
Some courts have been willing to allow the privilege to stand, acknowledging that the purpose of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is to
promote confidentiality, which ultimately enables more successful treatment. 248 In a 2000 parental rights termination case, the Supreme Court of

Id.

ployee, or as to information required to be recorded in a public office, if such report or record is open to public inspection ....
(6) Examination by Order of Judge. As to communications made in
the course of an examination ordered by the court of the physical,
mental or emotional condition of the patient, with respect to the
particular purpose for which the examination is ordered unless the
judge orders otherwise. This exception does not apply where the
examination is by order of the court upon the request of the lawyer
for the defendant in a criminal proceeding in order to provide the
lawyer with information needed so that the lawyer may advise the
defendant whether to enter a plea based on insanity or to present a
defense based on the defendant's mental or emotional condition.

245.
State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (holding that Alaska's mandatory child abuse reporting law did not abrogate the psychotherapist-patient privilege in
criminal proceedings).
246.
Id. at 275 (quoting ALASKA R. EviD. 504(d) commentary).
247.
See In re Joy P., 546 N.W.2d 494, 498 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
248.
In re Wieland, 733 N.E.2d 1127 (Ohio 2000). In this case, a mother, as part of a
case service plan, was ordered into substance abuse treatment. Id. at 1128-29. The juvenile
court ordered her treatment records should be disclosed despite the mother's objection that
she had not waived her privilege. Id. at 1129. The government argued that the purpose of the
privilege was undermined when the mother did not voluntarily enter treatment. Id. The court
held that the psychotherapist-patient privilege still applied to communications made during
treatment ordered as part of a case service plan. Id. at 1131.
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Ohio refused to abrogate the privilege. 249 In refusing to do so, it recognized
the concerns that are present in situations involving mandated treatment
under court ordered reunification plans, stating, "In other words, if a parent
is fearful that any communications with her provider will not be privileged,
she may not be open and truthful during treatment, thereby undermining the
effectiveness of treatment and ultimately defeating the goal of remedying
the reason for removal of the child., 250 Nevertheless, a mere seven months
after this decision was handed down, the Ohio legislature amended the
privilege statutes, abrogating the privileges for mental health professionals
involved in these proceedings. 251
Michigan has abrogated all privileges in child protection proceedings
except for the attorney-client privilege and the clergy privilege. Section 722
of the Michigan Compiled Laws provides:
Any legally recognized privileged communication except
that between attorney and client or that made to a member
of the clergy in his or her professional character in a confession or similarly confidential communication is abrogated and shall not constitute grounds for excusing a report
otherwise required to be made or for excluding evidence in
resulting from a report
a civil child protective proceeding
25 2
made pursuant to this act.

The Michigan Supreme Court has interpreted this statute broadly,
holding that testimony by a respondent mother's treating psychologist and
psychiatrist was admissible in a child protection proceeding even though
the testimony was related to treatment she received prior to the filing of a
petition alleging child abuse and neglect. 253 It noted, "the purpose of a child

protective proceeding is to protect the welfare of the child. It is in the best

249. Id.
250. In re Wieland, 733 N.E.2d at 1131 (quoting In re Wieland, No. 17646,1999 WL
961154, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. July 9, 1999)).
2317.02(B)(1)(b), (G)(1)(g) (LexisNexis 2005 &

251.

See OHIO REv. CODE ANN.

252.

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.631(11) (West Supp. 2008) ("This section does

§

Supp. 2009). The statute creates exceptions to the privilege for licensed independent social
workers and licensed psychologists who testify in civil actions concerning court-ordered
treatment or services received by a patient if the court-ordered treatment or services were
ordered as part of a case service plan in a child protection proceeding. Id. The exception also
applies when the court-ordered treatment or services are necessary or relevant to dependency, abuse or neglect, or permanent custody proceedings. Id.
not relieve a member of the clergy from reporting suspected child abuse or child neglect
under section 3 [mandatory reporting requirements] if that member of the clergy receives
information concerning suspected child abuse or child neglect while acting in any other
capacity listed under section 3.").
253. In re Brock, 499 N.W.2d 752 (Mich. 1993).
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interests of all parties for the fact finder to be 254
in possession of all relevant
information regarding the welfare of the child.,
E.

THE NATURE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE IN TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS PROCEEDINGS

Termination of parental rights proceedings vary slightly by jurisdiction, but they are all governed by state law that is influenced by federal
statutes, principally by the Adoption and Safe Families Act.255 Child abuse
and neglect proceedings are civil actions that consist of a series of hearings
that either conclude in dismissal of the action (and return of the child to the
parents' custody) or termination of parental rights.256 Michigan's child protection laws are presented in this section for illustration.
Child protection proceedings originate with the filing of a petition by
25 7
the state child welfare agency in the family division of the circuit court.

254.
Id. at 761 (citation omitted). Even though there is no psychotherapist-patient
privilege in child protection proceedings, court-appointed therapists or the social service
agency monitoring the case will often require respondents in these proceedings to sign waivers of the privilege. This can then turn what would otherwise be privileged information in
other proceedings into discoverable and admissible evidence. This is illustrated in People v.
Ackley where the defendant was referred to therapy by Child Protective Services as part of
his case service plan. No. 185904, 1997 WL 33353599, at *1 (Mich. App. Mar. 7, 1997). His
psychologist, Laura Nardi, obtained a signed waiver from him at the outset of therapy that
stated in part: "Your therapist may be called to testify in court. Under oath, he or she can be
ordered by a Judge to answer any questions an attorney asks." Id. The form also indicated,
"Your therapist is required by law to report any case of child abuse you tell him or her
about." Id. In his criminal trial, the court admitted testimony by Defendant's therapist that he
had admitted to committing acts of sexual abuse. Id. As a result, he was convicted of two
counts of first degree criminal sexual conduct involving his nine year old daughter. Id. He
appealed and objected to the admission of the testimony of this therapist on the grounds of
privilege. Id. The court found that the signed form constituted a clear waiver of his privilege
and that he could have expected that any statements he made after signing the form could be
the subject of later testimony. Ackley, 1997 WL 33353599, at *1. The court also noted that
the "[d]efendant was in no way coerced to sign the statements or to attend the counseling
sessions, even though he cooperated in the hope of keeping his family together." Id.
255.
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, ll Stat. 2115
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
256.
See infra notes 258-73 and accompanying text.
257.
See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 3.961. This article will use the State of Michigan's statutory scheme to explain these proceedings. In Michigan, the Department of Human Services
is required to submit a petition in certain enumerated situations, including child abandonment, criminal sexual conduct, or "battering, torture, or other severe physical abuse." MICH.
COMp. LAWS ANN. § 722.638 (West 2002). Section 722.638 of the Michigan Compiled Laws
provides, in relevant part:
(1) The department shall submit a petition for authorization by the court
under section 2(b) of chapter XIIA of 1939 PA 288, MCL 712A.2, if 1
or more of the following apply:
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State agencies are required by statute to file a petition in cases of physical
and sexual abuse, but these agencies will routinely request court intervention for less serious risks.258 Following the filing of a petition, a Michigan
court will take jurisdiction over a child if it finds that a child is neglected or
is subject to a substantial risk of harm. 259 Nationwide, the vast majority of
children who are removed from their homes and placed in foster care are
done so as a result of parental neglect related to poverty. 26

Id.

(a) The department determines that a parent, guardian, or custodian,
or a person who is 18 years of age or older and who resides for any
length of time in the child's home, has abused the child or a sibling
of the child and the abuse included 1 or more of the following:
(i) Abandonment of a young child.
(ii) Criminal sexual conduct involving penetration, attempted
penetration, or assault with intent to penetrate.
(iii) Battering, torture, or other severe physical abuse.
(iv) Loss or serious impairment of an organ or limb.
(v) Life threatening injury.
(vi) Murder or attempted murder.
(b) The department determines that there is risk of harm to the child
and either of the following is true:
(i) The parent's rights to another child were terminated as a result of proceedings under section 2(b) of chapter XIIA of 1939
PA 288, MCL 712A.2, or a similar law of another state.
(ii) The parent's rights to another child were voluntarily terminated following the initiation of proceedings under section
2(b) of chapter XIIA of 1939 PA 288, MCL 712A.2, or a similar law of another state.

Id.
258.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.2(b) (West 2002). The following two condi259.
tions are the most frequently cited by the courts:
(1) [A child whose] parent or other person legally responsible for the
care and maintenance of the juvenile, when able to do so, neglects or refuses to provide proper or necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or other care necessary for his or her health or morals, who is subject
to a substantial risk of harm to his or her mental well-being, who is
abandoned by his or her parents, guardian, or other custodian, or who is
without proper custody or guardianship.
(2) [A child whose] home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty,
drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent, guardian,
nonparent adult, or other custodian, is an unfit place for the juvenile to
live in.
Id.
DUNCAN LINDSEY, THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN 143 (1994); Martin Guggen260.
heim, Somebody's Children: Sustaining the Family's Place in Child Welfare Policy, 113
HARV. L. Rev. 1716, 1720 & n.83 (2000) (explaining that the children that are currently
removed from their homes due to alleged abuse and neglect are disproportionately poor and
nonwhite and come from single family households); Dorothy E. Roberts, Is There Justice in
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On the national level, the Adoption and Safe Families Act requires that
a state agency perform "reasonable efforts" to prevent the unnecessary dissolution of families. 26 1 The Act lists the following objectives:
(A) protecting and promoting the welfare of ...neglected
children; (B) preventing or remedying, or assisting in the
solution
of
problems
which
may
result
in... neglect... ; (C) preventing the unnecessary separation of children from their families by identifying family
problems, assisting families in resolving their problems,
and preventing breakup of the family where the prevention
of child removal is desirable and possible; [and] (D) restoring to their families children who have been removed, by
the provision of services to the child and the [family]...
262

In conjunction with the requirements of the Act, once a court has taken
jurisdiction over a child, the court will conduct a dispositional hearing in
which it reviews a case service plan prepared by the child protection
263 This plan
agency.26
sets forth the services to be provided to the families
and the conditions that must be met before a child will be returned to the
parent's custody.2 64 One condition that is routinely included in an agency's
case service plan is the requirement that a parent undergo a psychological
evaluation and participate in therapy.265
The dispositional hearing is followed by a series of hearings at which
time the court reviews the case service plan and agency reports and may
take testimony from the parents, children, foster parents, agency caseworkers, and others.266 The objective of these hearings is to "determine the extent of progress made toward alleviating or mitigating the conditions that
caused the child to be placed in foster care., 2 67 A parent's compliance with
Children's Rights? The Critique of Federal Family PreservationPolicy, 2 U. PA. J. CONST.

L. 112, 119 (1999).
261.
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94
Stat. 500.
Id. The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, which adopted
262.
these purposes, was the governing federal law dealing with child abuse and neglect until the
passage of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997.
263.
Id.
264.
See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 3.923(b).
265.
Id.
266.
MICH. CT. R. 3.975.
267.
Id. Michigan law also provides for a Permanency Planning Hearing, which is
required to be held within twelve months after a child has been removed from her home.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19a(l) (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); see also MICH. CT. R.
3.976 (setting forth the required procedures). The purpose of this hearing is to review the
child's situation and the progress that has been made toward the child's return home. See
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the agency case service plan is viewed as critical to this determination.26 8
Consequently, a parent's failure to participate or to make progress in courtordered therapy required as part of the case service plan will be viewed by
the court as evidence of a substantial risk of harm to a child.269
If the court believes that sufficient progress has not been made toward
allowing the child to safely return home, it will hold a Termination of Parental Rights Hearing. 270 Following the hearing, the court will order the
termination of parental rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence
that a statutory ground for termination exists 27 1 and that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest. 272
§ 712A.19a (West 2002 & Supp. 2008). This hearing differs from
a review hearing in that following a permanency planning hearing if the court determines
that the child is not able to safely return home, it may order the child protection agency to
begin proceedings to terminate parental rights. Id. § 712A.19a(6).
268.
Id. § 712A.19a(5) ("[T]he court shall view the failure of the parent to substantially comply with the terms and conditions of the case service plan prepared under ... this
chapter as evidence that the return of the child to his or her parent would cause a substantial
risk of harm to the child's life, physical health, or mental well-being.").
269.
Id.
270.
This hearing is held following the filing of an original, amended, or supplemental petition by the agency, the child, or the guardian, legal custodian, or representative of the
child. MICH. CT. R. 3.977. The petition may also be brought by a "concerned person" (which
is a specifically defined term in section 712.A.19b of the Michigan Code), the state children's ombudsman, or the prosecuting attorney. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19b (West
2002). The burden of proof is on the party seeking by court order to terminate the rights of
the parent over the child. MICH. CT. R. 3.977(A)(3); see also In re Trejo, 612 N.W.2d 407,
413 (Mich. 2000). There is no right to a jury trial. MICH. CT. R. 3.977(A)(3).
271.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19b(3) (West 2002). Section 712A.19(b) of
the Michigan Compiled Laws provides, in part:
The court may terminate a parent's parental rights to a child if the court
finds, by clear and convincing evidence, I or more of the following:
(a) The child has been deserted under any of the following circumstances:
(i) The child's parent is unidentifiable, has deserted the child
for 28 or more days, and has not sought custody of the child
during that period. For the purposes of this section, a parent is
unidentifiable if the parent's identity cannot be ascertained after reasonable efforts have been made to locate and identify
the parent.
(ii) The child's parent has deserted the child for 91 or more
days and has not sought custody of the child during that period.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.

(b) The child or a sibling of the child has suffered physical injury or
physical or sexual abuse under 1 or more of the following circumstances:
(i) The parent's act caused the physical injury or physical or
sexual abuse and the court finds that there is a reasonable like-
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lihood that the child will suffer from injury or abuse in the
foreseeable future if placed in the parent's home.
(ii) The parent who had the opportunity to prevent the physical
injury or physical or sexual abuse failed to do so and the court
finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will
suffer injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the
parent's home.
(iii) A nonparent adult's act caused the physical injury or
physical or sexual abuse and the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer from injury or
abuse by the nonparent adult in the foreseeable future if placed
in the parent's home.
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this
chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist
and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will
be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's
age.
(ii) Other conditions exist that cause the child to come within
the court's jurisdiction, the parent has received recommendations to rectify those conditions, the conditions have not been
rectified by the parent after the parent has received notice and
a hearing and has been given a reasonable opportunity to rectify the conditions, and there is no reasonable likelihood that
the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care
or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that
the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a
reasonable time considering the child's age.

Id.

(i) Parental rights to 1 or more siblings of the child have been terminated due to serious and chronic neglect or physical or sexual
abuse, and prior attempts to rehabilitate the parents have been unsuccessful.
(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is
returned to the home of the parent.

272.
See Deborah Paruch, The Orphaning of UnderprivilegedChildren: America's
Failed Child Welfare Law & Policy, 8 J.L. & FAM. STuD. 119 (2006) (discussing the best
interest of the child factor in termination of parental rights proceedings). The rules of evidence do not apply at any of these series of hearings, including the Termination of Parental
Rights Hearings. MICH. CT. R. 3.973. Instead, the court will admit "all relevant and material
evidence," generally in the form of oral and written information from the child care agency
worker, parents, and foster parents. Id.
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The court-ordered condition that a parent participate in therapy raises
the important question of whether the abrogation of the psychotherapistpatient privilege in these proceedings is justified, as the Michigan Supreme
Court has indicated, on the grounds that "[iut is in the best interests of all
parties for the fact finder to be in possession of all relevant information
regarding the welfare of the child. 27 3 For this paper, a sample of decisions
was retrieved from the Michigan Court of Appeals stemming from appeals
of parental rights termination orders in which the appellate court relied
upon a therapist's testimony in reaching its decision. The cases were retrieved by means of an electronic search request.274
Psychological evidence was admitted at the termination hearings in
each of the cases reviewed.275 The specific nature of the psychotherapist
evidence admitted in the parental rights termination proceedings was examined, along with the weight accorded this evidence by the courts. 2 76 The
description of this evidence in the opinions varied from a brief reference to
a full description of the testimony presented in the lower court proceedings.277 This testimony included statements or reports from professionals
who would fall under the therapist umbrella, such as social workers, psychologists, and psychiatrists.278 Not one case included a reference to the
qualifications of these individuals.2 79
Therapist testimony played an outcome-determinative role in the vast
majority of the termination of parental rights cases. 280 The nature of the
therapist testimony cited by the court of appeals was overwhelmingly nega-

273.
In re Brock, 499 N.W.2d 752, 761 (Mich. 1993).
274.
Thirty six decisions were retrieved on Westlaw when the search string of "parental /3 rights /pthera! Is testimony" was entered in the Michigan Cases database with the
search limited to the years after 2000. The court of appeals affirmed the trial courts' ruling
terminating the parental rights in thirty-five of the thirty-six cases. Recognizing that this
search retrieved only a small sample of the cases on appeal that involved psychotherapist
evidence, there is no reason to believe that the search failed to retrieve a representative sample of these cases.
275.
See supra note 274.
See supra note 274.
276.
277.
See supra note 274.
278.
See, e.g., In re Tuck, Nos. 268575, 268576, 2006 WL 2787839, at *1 (Mich. Ct.
App. Sept. 28, 2006).
279.
See supra note 274.
280.
Therapist testimony was not outcome determinative in all of the cases. See, e.g.,
In re A.C.G., No. 244302, 244387, 2003 WL 21205386, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. May 22,
2003); see also In re Slater, No. 275621, 2007 WL 2745215, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 20,
2007) (emphasizing the facts that the mother was unemployed and was not able to provide
her children with a home).
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tive in nature, 28 and in some cases, positive evidence was overshadowed by
the court's focus on the negative nature of a therapist's testimony. 282
Therapist testimony was found to be evidence of the condition for termination under subsections (3)(c)(i) 28 3 and (3)(j) 284 of section 7 12A. 19b of
the Michigan Code in sixty-seven percent of the cases reviewed. 85 Additionally, therapist testimony was used as a means of proving the conditions
contained in section 712A.19b(3)(g) 286 in eighty-nine percent of the cases
reviewed.2 87
281.
Only two cases out of the thirty-six reviewed contained positive therapist testimony. In re Mahon contained mostly positive testimony from the therapists, and the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's decision denying the petition to terminate parental rights.
No. 276118, 2007 WL 2429378, at *1-*2 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2007). The case of In re
Buck also contained mostly positive testimony by the therapist. No. 268073, 2006 WL
2270389, at *1-*2 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2006).
282.
Note the case of In re Hanna in which the testimony of the mother's therapist,
who felt the mother had gained insight and achieved personal growth that would positively
affect her children, was overcome by negative testimony of a psychologist hired by the court
to perform a psychological evaluation. No. 263791, 2006 WL 141869, *1 (Mich. Ct. App.
Jan. 19, 2006).
283.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A. 19b(3)(c)(i) (West 2002) ("The conditions that
led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.").
284.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19b(3)(j) (West 2002) ("There is a reasonable
likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be
harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.").
285.
See supra note 274.
286.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19b(3)(g) (West 2002) ("The parent, without
regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a
reasonable time considering the child's age.").
287.
See supra note 274. Courts will frequently cite more than one statutory ground
as the basis for their order terminating parental rights. See, e.g., In re McBride, Nos. 282062,
282243, 2008 WL 2751233, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. July 15, 2008). The conditions surrounding the termination of parental rights appeared to be conducive to therapeutic treatment of
the parents, children, or both, but such conditions were not enough to overcome the "reasonable likelihood" and/or the "reasonable time frame" requirements of section 712A. 19b of the
Michigan Code. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A. 19b (West 2002). Twenty-six of the cases
(72%) had situations in which: (1) the parent(s) suffered from drug addiction or mental
illness/deficiencies, or (2) the children had mental and/or physical abnormalities that required special care. See supra note 274. These types of conditions may be overcome with the
assistance of therapeutic treatment or training, but testimony from the therapists concerning
the likelihood of recovery and recovery time frames played a determinative role in the
courts' decisions to terminate the parental rights because of the requirements of section
712A.19b of the Michigan Code. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19b (West 2002). For
example, in the case of In re Mcbride, the mother's therapist testified that it would take
longer than six months for her to overcome her addiction to prescription medication because
the mother was in the middle phase of an eighteen month recovery program. Nos. 282062,
282243, 2008 WL 2751233, at *2-*3 (Mich. Ct. App. July 14, 2008). The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights because it believed that an
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The courts' reliance on the therapists' testimony suggests that this evidence is necessary for a proper adjudication of these cases. Indeed, this is
corroborated by judges' own responses to questions directed toward assessing the importance of this information in their decision making.288 However, of the cases reviewed for this paper, not one case was found where the
testimony of a parent's treating therapist seemed to be essential to a proper
adjudication of the case.289
There were several cases in which the court cited a parent's failure to
participate in therapy as grounds for termination of parental rights. 290 In In
re Kalman, the court terminated a mother's parental rights based on the
findings that she had taken herself off of her prescribed medications and
had stopped attending therapy. 291 It stated that "[a] parent's failure to comply with the essential requirement of her treatment plan may
292 justify termination of her parental rights based on continuing neglect.,
In many of the cases reviewed, although the treating therapist's testimony was important to the court's decision to terminate parental rights, the
information obtained through this testimony could have been acquired
through other means with little or no difficulty.2 93 The following cases illustrate this point. In In re Tuck, a mother's therapist testified that she "had not
yet attained the physical stability or parenting ability necessary to provide a
eighteen month recovery was not a reasonable time considering the child's age. Id. at *9*11.
288.
See supra notes 223-27 and accompanying text.
See supra note 274.
289.
See In re Forehand, No. 280404, 2008 WL 1885818, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr.
290.
29, 2008); In re Ostrander, No. 274901, 2007 WL 2404726, at *1-*2 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug.
23, 2007); In re C.T.T.T., No. 239403, 2003 WL 462371, at *1-*3 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 21,
2003).
291.
No. 280854, 2008 WL 1886334, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2008).
Id. (citing In re Hall, 469 N.W.2d 56 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991)).
292.
See supra note 274. Cases were also retrieved through the search where psycho293.
logical evidence was admitted that resulted from a court-ordered evaluation. See, e.g., In re
Ostrander,No. 274901, 2007 WL 2404726, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007). These cases are
not discussed since they do not involve the abrogation of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. In these situations, it is generally accepted that there will not be any confidentiality
since the sole purpose of the evaluation is to provide information to the court. Further, there
were several cases in which the court cited a parent's failure to participate in therapy as
grounds for termination of parental rights. See In re Forehand, No. 280404, 2008 WL
1885818, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2008); In re Ostrander, No. 274901, 2007 WL
2404726, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2007); In re C.T.T.T., No. 239403, 2003 WL
462371, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2003). In In re Kalman, the court terminated a
mother's parental rights based on findings that she had taken herself off of her prescribed
medications and had stopped attending therapy. No. 280854, 2008 WL 1886334, at *1
(Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2008). It stated, "A parent's failure to comply with the essential
requirement of her treatment plan may justify termination of her parental rights based on
continuing neglect." Id. (citing In re Hall, 469 N.W.2d 56 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991)).
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suitable environment for the children and that... [her relationship with her
husband] was unstable., 294 Evidence of the fact that she lacked "physical
stability" could easily have been introduced through the caseworker.29 5
Evidence of her inadequate "parenting ability" could also have been introduced through her caseworker, through an independent psychological
evaluation, or from a parenting class instructor.296 Evidence of her unstable
marriage could have been introduced through her caseworker, by relatives
and friends, or through her or her husband's admissions.2 97
A mother's parental rights were terminated in In re Buck due to her
history of drug abuse and her inability to maintain suitable housing. 298 Her
therapist testified at the termination hearing that she had stopped using
drugs; however, he admitted that he had not verified this by requiring her to
submit to drug screens. 299 In this case, her agency caseworker could easily
have testified that these tests had not been performed. 300 Respondent's
therapist also testified that a person generally "needs to be sober for a year
30 1
before she would be deemed fairly stable in her sobriety and abstinence.,
This information is readily available in professional journals of which the
court could take judicial notice.3 °2
In In re Jackson, the court terminated a mother's parental rights because she suffered from a serious mental illness and was unable to properly
care for her children. 30 3 The evidence also demonstrated that she refused to
recognize her illness or remain compliant with her prescribed medications. 304 Although this information was admitted through the testimony of
her treating therapists, it could also have been obtained as the result of a
court-ordered evaluation
and the reports and testimony of the caseworker
30 5
assigned to this case.
In another case, In re Flores, the court of appeals upheld a family
court's order terminating a mother's parental rights based on testimony
294.
Nos. 268575, 268576, 2006 WL 2787839, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 28,
2006).
295.
Id.
296.
Id.
297.
Id. at *1-'2.
298.
No. 268073, 2006 WL 2270389, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2006).
299.
Id.
300.
Id.
301.
Id.
302.
See, e.g., The Betty Ford Inst. Consensus Panel, What is Recovery? A Working
Definition from the Betty Ford Institute, 33 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 221, 224
(2007) (recognizing that "sustained sobriety" is sobriety lasting more than one year).
303.
In re Jackson, No. 228188, 2001 WL 850096, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. July 27,
2001).
304.
Id. at *1-*2.
305.
See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 3.323(B).
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from her treating therapist that "[she] was not ready to avoid violent relationships as of the date of the termination trial.,, 306 The court's admission of
this evidence raises serious concerns not only because it was unnecessarythere was ample evidence in the record of her unwillingness to end her abusive relationship with her son's father-but also because it clearly presents
an example of the court's willingness to admit and rely on this type of evidence, which lacks any indicia of scientific reliability. °7
There were other cases in which the court relied heavily on a treating
therapist's testimony in reaching its decision to terminate parental rights
even though the testimony did not appear necessary for a proper adjudication of the case.30 8 This testimony was not necessary either because the testimony was a needless presentation of cumulative evidence or because there
30 9
was ample other evidence on the record to support the court's decision.
In re Perez is one such case. 310 That case involved alleged acts of sexual
abuse against the respondents' fifteen-year-old daughter by the paternal
grandfather who was residing in the respondents' home at the time of the
alleged acts. 3 11 The court ordered re-unification plan required the respondents to distance themselves from the grandfather and to prevent any contact between the grandfather and the children.312 Evidence presented during
the pendency of the case, including the parents' own admissions, indicated
that they continued to have frequent contact with the grandfather.3 13 The
court terminated their parental rights on the grounds that they failed to provide proper care and custody of the children. 314 The treating therapist's testimony at the termination hearing that the parent's "refused to distance
themselves from ... [the grandfather's] influence and that neither [parent]

was willing to prevent contact between. ..[the grandfather] and the children," was duplicative and unnecessary.

306.
No. 266155, 266156, 2006 WL 1195861, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. May 4, 2006).
307.
This type of testimony should also be considered irrelevant because it does not
provide any therapeutic information concerning the parents or any rehabilitative efforts
made by the therapist on behalf of the parent. Another example of this type of testimony is
found in In re Hanna,where a psychologist opined "that it was more likely than not that [the
parent] would continue in an unstable pattern of short-term relationships." No. 263791, 2006
WL 141869, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2006).
See, e.g., In re Perez, No. 257300, 257529, 2005 WL 1124094, *1 (Mich. Ct.
308.
App. May 12, 2005).
309.
See, e.g., id.
Id.
310.
311.
Id. at *1-'2.
312.
Id. at *1.
313.
Id.
In re Perez, 2005 WL 1124094, at *2.
314.
315.
Id.
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In In re Kelly, a mother's therapist testified that she suffered from a
dissociative disorder, which began in childhood, that caused her to "focus[]
a great deal of her energy on her romantic partner to the point that she neglected herself and her children's needs," that she "could parent at only
forty percent effectiveness," and that she was unable to "provide long-term
emotional support" for her children.31 6 However, there was ample other
evidence in the record to justify the termination, including: (1) the foster
care worker's testimony that the mother failed to provide a suitable home
and that the baby often returned from visitations with poor hygiene and
dirty diapers; (2) the mother failed to keep a neuropsychological examination appointment or attend rehabilitative therapy; (3) one child's emotional
development was seriously disrupted while another child reported that he
feared being harmed by his parents; (4) a report of physical abuse of a child
by an extended family member in her home; (5) the foster care worker's
testimony that respondent's parental rights should be terminated; (6) the
mother's statements that, due to cognitive problems, she could only focus
on one thing at a time; and, most importantly, (7) the mother's own admission that that she could not raise all four of her children.317
In In re D.R. T., a young boy had been in foster care for three years at
the time of the termination hearing.318 The record demonstrated that the
father failed to find appropriate housing, failed to benefit from parenting
classes, and only sporadically attended therapy sessions. 3 19 The record further indicated that he was incarcerated for a three-month period during the
pendency of this case and failed to inform anyone, particularly his caseworker, of his situation. 320 The record also showed that when his young son
developed a serious mental illness, which included hallucinations and hearing voices, the father remarked that his child's hallucinations were merely
an attempt to get attention. 321 The father's therapist testified that he "did not
understand the importance of stable housing or why it was important to
meet his son's most basic needs. 32 2 She also testified that the father and
son "seemed to behave more like brothers than father and son, discussing
video games, cartoons, and the minor child's love life," and opined that the
minor child's cognitive problems were caused by a "lack of effort" on the
part of the father.323

316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

No. 233067, 2001 WL 1324684, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2001).
Id.
No. 235308, 2002 WL 31058353, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2002).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In re Turlin is an example of a case where the treating therapist's testimony is a needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 324 The case concerned a mother who spent twenty-two months in federal prison on drug
charges. 325 Her children, who were four-years-old and seven-months-old at
the time of her arrest, were placed with their paternal grandmother, where
they remained throughout the case.326 Respondent completed an intensive
drug treatment plan and parenting classes while in prison and obtained employment and housing following her release. 327 However, she was reincarcerated for fifty-eight days for violating the terms of her parole and
married a man with a long criminal history. 328 A psychologist hired by the
court to evaluate her testified that he was concerned about the harm to her
children if they were taken from their grandmother's custody. 329 Respondent's treating therapist also testified at the termination hearing at which
time he recommended that the court terminate her parental rights and expressed his concern over the emotional harm to the children that would result if they were removed from their grandmother's care.330

Another case in which a therapist's testimony was a needless presentation of cumulative evidence is In re Service.33 1 That case involved the termination of a mother's parental rights to her infant son, Cody, who was
removed from her care two days after his birth.332 The agency removed the
infant because the mother's parental rights to a previous child, Taylor, were
terminated due to serious physical abuse.333 Taylor was found to have broken ribs, a broken clavicle, and fractures of her femur and tibia.334 She also
had a collection of blood in her chest and abdomen, numerous unexplained
bruises, and was significantly underweight. 335 Other evidence on the record
that supported the termination of the mother's parental rights to Cody included: (1) her failure to admit responsibility for Taylor's injuries, (2) conflicting statements she made regarding Taylor's injuries, (3) her problem
with anger, (4) her marginal bonding with Taylor, (5) her reported anxiety
in the hospital while caring for the new infant, and (6) her "flat effect" with

324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

No. 266599, 266600, 2006 WL 1691159, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. June 20, 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Turlin, 2006 WL 1691159, at *1.
In re Service, No. 256037, 2004 WL 2913640, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 16,

332.
333.
334.
335.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2004).
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Cody.336 The mother's therapist testified that she was "very frustrated and
ill-equipped to care for a child. 337
V.

CRITICISMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There is overwhelming agreement among the mental health professions that confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful treatment and a
critical component of the psychotherapist-patient relationship.338 Numerous
studies confirm that a meaningful therapeutic relationship, described as a
"working alliance, founded on trust, openness, genuineness and congruence," 3 9 is essential to the successful outcome of therapy.34 °
The need for confidentiality in the psychotherapist-patient relationship
has been confirmed by various empirical studies conducted within the past
twenty years. 34' These studies show that a patient's willingness to self-

disclose sensitive information is significantly higher when they are informed that their disclosures will remain confidential.34 2 Conversely, patient self-disclosures, particularly of sensitive or embarrassing matters, decrease significantly when they are informed that their communications will
not remain confidential.34 3 Furthermore, a patient's willingness to engage in
therapy decreases appreciably when the risk of compelled disclosure is
high, as in the case of Maryland's mandated reporting statutes evidenced in
the Johns Hopkins study.344 These factors directly impact the likelihood that
therapy will be successful.345 Additionally, the United States Supreme

Court in Jaffee v. Redmond acknowledged that important public and private
interests are served when confidential communications between patients
and therapists are protected from disclosure. 346 The Court also acknowledged that facilitating the provision of mental health services works to im-

336.
Id.
337.
In re Service, 2004 WL 2913640, at *1.
338.
See, e.g., Honea-Boles & Griffin, supra note 99, at 150.
339.
Id.
340.
Id. at 149 (discussing numerous studies that address the importance of the
therapeutic relationship and the positive effect of what the authors term a "working alliance"
on positive therapeutic outcomes).
341.
See supra Part III.
342.
See supra Part III.
343.
See supra Part III.
344.
Fred S. Berlin, H. Martin Malin & Sharon Dean, Effects of Statutes Requiring
Psychiatrists to Report Suspected Sexual Abuse of Children, 4 AM. J. PsYcHIATRY 449
(1991).
345.
See supra Part HI.
346.
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 2 (1996).
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prove the mental health of the community, which it noted is a "public good
of transcendent importance. 34 7

Unfortunately, the legal protection afforded to these important communications evaporates when legal proceedings arise that involve the welfare of children. Legislators, acting upon the need to protect children, have
statutorily abrogated the privilege in cases involving child custody determinations and child abuse and neglect. 348 Judges, likewise, readily admit
therapist testimony in these proceedings based on the belief that the need
for evidence in these cases far outweighs the value in psychotherapistpatient confidentiality. 349 However, the abrogation of this vital privilege is
simply not justified on these grounds, and the private and public harm resulting from its rejection far outweighs the meager value of the evidence
that is often obtained.
The harm that results from the compelled disclosure of confidential
communications between patients and their therapists takes many forms.
First, the abrogation of the psychotherapist-patient privilege raises what
should be seen as insurmountable ethical dilemmas for therapists, particularly when their patients are ordered into therapy by a court. One author has
declared that "'enforced therapeutic relationships are a sham'

. . .

dehuman-

izing and dishonest., 350 As such, these relationships have drawn sharp criticism from professionals in the mental health field. 35 1 Another author has
opined that "[p]sychotherapists and counselors who enter a therapeutic relationship with a court-ordered client are entering an ethical minefield containing serious threats to professional psychotherapy. 35 2 This occurs because this form of mandated treatment creates the "traditional anathema for
most counselors of a dual relationship" where they are at the command of
two masters-the ethical
responsibilities of the profession and the legal
35 3
directives of the court.
Robert Shearer contends that mandated therapy violates the code of
ethics of several professional organizations since mandated therapy is not
supported by informed consent. 354 He notes that written consent is not effective because if patients can be ordered to participate in counseling, they
can be ordered to sign waiver forms that indicate that there will be no con347.
Id. at 11.
348.
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20B(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2009).
349.
See supra Part IV.C.
350.
Honea-Boles & Griffin, supra note 99, at 152 (quoting Judith Cingolami, Social
Conflict Perspective on Work with Involuntary Clients, 29 SOC. WORK 442, 446 (1984)).
351.
Id. at 152-54.
352.
Robert A. Shearer, Court Ordered Counseling, An Ethical Minefieldfor Psychotherapists,ANNALS OF AM. PSYCHOTHERAPY ASS'N, Fall 2003, at 8, 9.
353.
Id. at 11.
354.
Id. at 10-11.
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fidentiality in the relationship. 355 He also questions how a therapist can develop a trusting relationship when the patient is aware that the counselor is
paid by the court or a state agency and that the therapist may be subpoenaed
to testify against him. 356 Most importantly, the mental health professional is
precluded from functioning as a therapist in these situations and is asked to
assume the role of state investigator.357 This change in role from healer to
adversary occurs when 358
the decision to terminate parental rights is based on
the findings of therapy.
Moreover, patients involved in mandated therapy suffer harm when
the therapist is obligated to report back to the court or state agency. These
patients are caught in the proverbial "Catch 22" situation. If they resist
treatment, they are viewed as noncooperative, 359 and the failure to participate in therapy when the therapy is a component of the agency service plan
is grounds for termination of parental rights. 360 On the other hand, any
negative thoughts, actions, or feelings that are self-disclosed in therapy can
be used against them in termination proceedings. 36 1 This appalling situation
becomes even more appalling as oftentimes the parents embroiled in these
proceedings have a tremendous need for therapy. 362 One author has commented:
This is a difficult situation. On the one hand, these parents
are often among the most unempowered people in our society. They tend to be poor, often on some kind of welfare
(usually AFDC), relatively socially isolated, and often with
no support system. It is important for them to know, at this
critical time when it may appear to them that they are being
victimized by the system, that there is someone who is "on
their side," listening to them and there to help them.36 3
The practice of mandated therapy coupled with the abrogation of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is in direct conflict with the federally recognized policy goal of preserving families. This practice violates the "reasonable efforts" requirement set forth in the Adoption and Safe Families
Act, which requires that state social service agencies make reasonable ef355.
Id. at 10.
356.
Id. at 11.
357.
See id. at 10-11.
358.
Honea-Boles & Griffin, supra note 99, at 153.
359.
Id.
360.
Id.
361.
See In re Brock, 499 N.W.2d 752, 761 (Mich. 1993).
362.
See Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of
Children and the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REv. 79, 169 (1997).
363.
Id. at 130.
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forts to assist families in solving the problems that can result in neglect. 36
The practice of requiring parents to engage in "mock" therapy devoid of the
essential components that would allow for successful treatment coupled
with the fact that the therapist is asked to assume the role of state investigator and witness results in a process where the deck is stacked against the
parents and, accordingly, where they are likely to fail. This is not a service
designed to assist the parents in alleviating the conditions that prevent their
children from returning home. While arranging and paying for this mandated therapy may qualify as an effort on the part of the state agency, it
certainly is not reasonable.
Similar criticisms of the practice of judicially compelled disclosure of
confidential information by a treating therapist apply when parents are engaged in a disputed child custody battle. Although many of the serious ethical dilemmas encountered in the case of mandated therapy are not present
in these situations, there is a serious risk of substantial harm to the therapeutic relationship. In jurisdictions that hold that the psychotherapistpatient privilege is waived once a parent petitions for custody of a child,
there is a serious risk that any communications between the therapist and
the patient will be subject to judicially compelled disclosure.36 5 The empirical studies have shown that patient self-disclosures decrease dramatically
with an increased risk of litigation in which a therapist could be compelled
to disclose confidential patient information.366 Under these circumstances,
some therapists have taken to limiting the types of issues discussed in therapy even though they acknowledge that "limitations of this sort may not be
the optimal therapeutic strategy. 3 67
The Jaffee Court noted that compared to the important public and private interests supporting the acceptance of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the expected evidentiary benefit to be gained from the rejection of the
privilege "is modest., 368 However, it is not simply the amount of evidence
that should be considered; the reliability of any evidence garnered under
these circumstances must also be seriously questioned. When there is no
assurance of confidentiality in the therapeutic relationship it is highly
unlikely that a meaningful relationship can be established and there is a low
probability that the treatment will be successful. 369 Any information ob-

364.
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
365.
See cases cited supra note 221.
366.
See supra Part III.
367.
Shuman & Foote, supra note 130, at 485.
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996).
368.
369.
See supra Part III.
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tained as a370result of this flawed therapeutic process can have little meaningful value.
It is remarkable that many of the jurisdictions that abrogate the psychotherapist-patient privilege on the ground that it is necessary for the protection of children continue to recognize the clergy privilege and the attorney-client privilege. 371 The rationales provided in support of the clergy
privilege include the need to foster the clergy-confider relationship and the
individual right to privacy.372 It has been suggested that the clergy privilege
is also justified by the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause because it
accommodates the religious practice of confiders and the clergy's objections to compelled disclosure. 373 However, absent the interest in spiritual
rehabilitation, the justifications for the clergy privilege are the same as
those put forth for the psychotherapist-patient privilege.374 This raises the
question of whether a person's interest in spiritual rehabilitation or solace is
so far superior to the interest of a patient who is struggling to sustain his
mental and emotional health such that it validates the abrogation of the psychotherapist privilege while the clergy privilege is preserved.
There are numerous justifications put forth in support of the attorneyclient privilege. It is universally believed that the privilege is necessary in
order to encourage open communication between attorneys and clients,
which, in turn, facilitates the rendering of legal advice.375 It is thought that
compelling disclosure of a "client's secrets would force an act of betrayal
that would undermine the heart of professionalism., 376 Some predict that in
the absence of a privilege, "lawyers would be cast in the beginning as po370.
See supra Part III.
371.
It has been reported that six states expressly abrogate the clergy privilege
whereas approximately half of the states appear to include the clergy privilege in statutes
abrogating other professional privileges. Mary Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child
Abuse Reporting Requirements Versus the Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion,
71 MINN. L. REv. 723 (1987); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-10 (2007) ("Any privilege of communication between husband and wife or between any professional person and
his patient or client, except the attorney and client, is abrogated and does not constitute
grounds for preventing a report to be made or for excluding evidence in any proceeding
regarding child abuse or neglect resulting from a report made under this chapter.").
372.
Mitchell, supra note 371, at 762-69.
373.
Id. at 791.
374.
Compare Mitchell, supra note 371, at 762-69 (noting the rationales behind the
clergy privilege as protecting the individual's right to privacy and the need to foster the
clergy-confider relationship), with REISNER ET AL., supra note 24, at 297 (recognizing that a
psychotherapist-patient privilege protects the right of individuals to control the disclosure of
personal medical information, which is closely tied to the individual's right to privacy), and
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1996) (finding that a psychotherapist-patient privilege creates a level of confidence required for effective treatment).
375.
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 2, § 5.8, at 309-10.
376.
Id. § 5.8, at 308 (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An HistoricalPerspective on
the Attorney-Client Privilege,66 CAL. L. REv. 1061 (1978)).
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tential adversaries to their own clients.

377

Indeed, it has been said that

"'[e]very feeling of justice, honour and humanity would be shocked' by an
attorney's breach of a client's confidences."3 78
As with the clergy privilege, each of these rationales apply with equal
force to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Compelled disclosure of
these private communications forces "an act of betrayal" that undermines
the heart of the mental health profession.3 79 Compelled disclosure by thera-

pists, particularly in the case of mandated treatment, casts them as "potential adversaries" to their patients. 38 Indeed, "'justice, honor and humanity"'
should be "'shocked"' by the compelled disclosure of these confidential
communications in judicial proceedings.3 8' Simply put, there is no rational
reason for the inconsistent treatment of these two privileges in cases involving the welfare of children.
The legislatures' and courts' willingness to abrogate the psychotherapist-patient privilege while allowing these other privileges to remain intact
must be based either on their failure to recognize the value of confidentiality to the therapeutic relationship or because they place little value on psychotherapy per se. This is evidenced by Justice Scalia's dissenting comments in Jaffee v. Redmond382
in which he equates the role of a psychotherapist with that of a bartender.
When is it, one must wonder, that the psychotherapistcame
to play such an indispensable role in the maintenance of the
citizenry's mental health? For most of history, men and
women have worked out their difficulties by talking to, inter alias, parents, siblings, best friends, and bartendersnone of83 whom was awarded a privilege against testifying in
court.

3

This unwillingness to recognize the value of therapy is wholly inconsistent with the heavy reliance that family courts place on the testimony and

377.
378.

Id. § 5.8, at 309.
Id. § 5.8, at 309 n.7 (quoting 1 EDWARD LIVINGSTON, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
EDWARD LIVINGSTON ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE 461 (1873)).
379.
Id. § 5.8, at 308-09.
380.
Cf id. § 5.8, at 308.
381.
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 2, § 5.8, at 309 n.7 (quoting I EDWARD
LIVINGSTON, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF EDWARD LIVINGSTON ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE
461 (1873)).
382.
See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 22 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
383.

Id.
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opinions of mental health expert witnesses. 384 As such, it presents an interesting quagmire for courts in that if the practice of psychotherapy has genuine value, as the Supreme Court has indicated,385 then confidentiality in the
therapeutic relationship is worthy of protection. On the other hand, if psychotherapy has limited value, then the evidence that is produced through
this process is not reliable and should be excluded on these grounds.
The compelled testimony of a treating therapist is a convenient means
of obtaining evidence in proceedings involving the welfare of children;
however, there are ample other means of obtaining similar evidence. This is
demonstrated in the sample of Michigan cases reviewed in the previous
section of this article. 386 In contested child custody cases and in child protection proceedings, courts may obtain relevant information regarding the
387
parents and the children through court ordered psychological evaluations.
If the court orders a parent into therapy and is concerned with whether the
parent is making progress, an independent follow-up evaluation can be obtained. 388 Guardian ad litems are also routinely employed in both of these
proceedings and can provide valuable information regarding what is in a
child's best interest.3 89 Court Appointed Special Advocates, or CASA
workers, are also frequently used in child protection proceedings and can
give helpful information to the court. 3 90 Finally, in child protection proceedings, the agency caseworker is the principal investigator for the state and
has a wealth of information about the family.3 9'
The mandated reporting requirements that are in effect in each of the
fifty states require designated persons to report suspected cases of child

384.
Compare id. (analogizing a therapist to a bartender), with supra Part IV.C (discussing various studies recognizing the importance that family court judges place on the
testimony of mental health expert witnesses).
385.
See Jaffee, 518 U.S. 1.
386.
See supra notes 274-337 and accompanying text.
Courts have the authority to order a variety of services for the parents and chil387.
dren in child protection proceedings. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19a (West
2002 & Supp. 2008); MICH. CT. R. 3.973.
388.
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 712A.19a (West 2002 & Supp. 2008);
MICH. Cr. R. 3.973.
389.
See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 3916. For a discussion of the role of the guardian ad
litem in these proceedings, see Donald N. Duquette, Legal Representation of Children: Two
DistinctLawyer Roles are Required, 34 FAM. L.Q. 441 (2000).
390.
CASA workers are volunteers appointed by a court to advocate for the interests
of children involved in child abuse and neglect proceedings. For a detailed description of the
program,
see CASA: Court
Appointed Special Advocates
for Children,
http://www.nationalcasa.org (last visited Apr. 30, 2009).
391.
See Michigan Department of Human Services: Children's Protective Services
Investigation
Process,
http://www.michigan.gov/dhs/0, 1607,7-124-5452_7119_7194159484--,00.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2009).
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abuse and neglect to the state child protection agency.392 Recognition of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege has no effect on a therapist's duty under
these statutes. If a treating therapist reasonably believes that a child is being
harmed or is at a significant risk of being harmed, he must report his suspicions to the child protection agency.393 However, a therapist's compliance
with these statutory duties should not also imply a duty to testify against his
patient in subsequent civil or criminal proceedings.
The rationale applied by the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Hayes, in
which the court refused to graft a dangerous patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, 394 is equally applicable to cases involving
mandated reporting of suspected child abuse and neglect. The Hayes court
drew a distinction between warning a third party about threats made against
them by a patient and subsequent judicially compelled testimony.3 95 It noted
that although these warnings may have a "marginal" effect on the therapeutic relationship, it would not produce the devastating effect that compelled
testimony would.39 6

In the case of mandated reporting statutes, the public interest in the
protection of children is served when a report of suspected abuse or neglect
is made by a therapist to the state agency. However, this breach of confidentiality does carry a cost. It has been shown to have a negative effect on
the psychotherapist-patient relationship, as demonstrated by the Johns Hopkins study. 397 That being said, the damage to the therapist-patient relationship is far less severe than the deleterious effect caused by the abrogation of
the privilege.

392.
For a discussion of mandated reporting requirements, see Mitchell, supra note
371, at 725-34, and also see Murray Levine, A TherapeuticJurisprudenceAnalysis of Mandated Reporting of Child Maltreatment by Psychotherapists, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTs.
711 (1993).
393.
See Levine, supra note 163, at 716.
394.
227 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2000).
395.
Id. at 586.
396.
Id. at 585.
397.
See Fred S. Berlin et al., Effects of Statutes Requiring Psychiatriststo Report
Suspected Sexual Abuse of Children, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 449 (1991). Some therapists
criticize the mandatory reporting laws because of the harm that they cause to the therapistpatient relationship. See Steven R. Smith & Robert G. Meyer, Child Abuse Reporting Laws
and Psychotherapy: A Time for Reconsideration, 7 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 351 (1984).
The authors argue that the requirement to report suspected cases of child abuse or neglect
may have an antitherapeutic effect in that it may limit the topics that are brought out for
discussion and, therefore, fail to protect children from further episodes. Id. at 351, 358-60.
They advocate for changes to the mandatory reporting laws eliminating the reporting requirement when a therapist receives information about child abuse from the abuser-patient
unless there is a threat of serious, permanent harm to a child, the therapy is not progressing
satisfactorily, or the threat of abuse continues. Id. at 362-63.
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An absolute abrogation of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in
cases involving the welfare of children serves no one's best interest. When
parents who are experiencing emotional problems as a result of a divorce
are hesitant to seek help, their children will suffer. When a child abuser
refuses to participate in treatment, children will suffer. It is time for legislators and judges to engage in a re-evaluation of the practice of abrogating the
privilege in family law proceedings. Some therapists argue that the psychotherapist-patient privilege should be "inviolate to breach by external authority," including investigations by governmental agencies and court subpoenas. 398 However, when young children are involved, a delicate balancing act
is required since there is no more compelling interest than the protection of
innocent children.
Some courts have adopted a case by case balancing approach when
faced with having to decide whether to require a therapist to disclose confidential patient information.? This approach, which was specifically rejected by the Jaffee Court on the grounds that it "would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege,' 4 requires a court to balance the patient's interest in confidentiality against the need for the evidence. 40 1 However, a
simple balancing test can easily fail to afford the protection that the psychotherapist-patient privilege deserves. The subjective value that the court
places on the evidence can easily tip the scales in favor of compelling disclosure of the confidential information-a situation not unlike the present
state of the law.
The guidelines established by the American Psychiatric Association
that were originally drafted to be used in contested custody cases seem to
best achieve the goal of protecting children while preserving the confidential nature of the therapeutic relationship.4 2 The association recommends
that courts only consider therapist testimony in cases where a parent's capacity to adequately care for a child because of emotional instability is at
issue.4 °3 Before a court may consider therapist testimony, it must make a
preliminary judicial finding that a parent is currently unable to provide ade398.
Louis Everstein, Diana Sullivan Everstein, Gary Heyman, Reiko Homma True,
David H. Frey, Harold G. Johnson & Richard H. Seiden, Privacy and Confidentiality in
Psychotherapy,35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 828 (1980).
399.
See cases cited supra note 218.
400.
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1996). The Court also noted that "[a]n
uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all." Id. at 18.
401.
See, e.g., Cabrera v. Cabrera, 580 A.2d 1227, 1233 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990) (stating that the party seeking admission of evidence subject to the psychotherapist-patient privilege must demonstrate to the court that justice requires admission of the evidence).
402.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASs'N, supra note 206, at 2-4.
403.
Id. at 2-3.
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quate care for the child. 40 4 This initial finding must be supported by substantial,5 reliable independent evidence of mental or emotional impair4
ment. 0
Following such a finding, the court will need to determine whether the
disclosure of confidential therapist-patient information will assist the court
in rendering a decision as to the parent's ability to adequately care for the
child. 4 6 In doing so, the courts should consider the following criteria: (1)
the gravity of the psychiatric disorder and the type of the treatment; (2) the
"recency/chronicity" of the treatment; and (3) whether the information can
be obtained from other sources, including a court-ordered evaluation by an
independent therapist.4 7 Courts should be required to make specific findings on the record for each of the criteria.40 8 This approach acknowledges
that there will be circumstances where it is necessary to compel disclosure
of some patient confidences; however, this approach assures that patient
confidences are disclosed only in exceptional circumstances. Finally, this
approach eliminates the distasteful but all too common practice of using
mental health professionals as state investigators in cases involving the
wellbeing of children.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Social policy aims, professional ethical requirements, and legal constraints should be harmonious; however, they are at odds with each other in
cases involving the welfare of children. The mental health profession recognizes the importance of confidentiality in the psychotherapeutic relationship and the impact that this has on treatment. As such, professional ethical
standards require that therapists protect the confidentiality of patient disclosures. These standards are supported by empirical data.
Even though the importance of protecting the confidentiality of the
therapeutic relationship is clear, the psychotherapist-patient testimonial
privilege, which prohibits the compulsory disclosure of confidential psychotherapist information in legal actions, is freely abrogated in cases involving the wellbeing of children. This article has challenged the assumptions underlying the abrogation of the privilege and the practice of routinely
admitting treating therapist testimony in these types of cases.
The wholesale abrogation of this privilege carries a significant cost
both for individuals and for society as a whole in that it drastically reduces
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
Id.
Id.
AM. PsYcIATRIc ASS'N, supra note 206, at 4.
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the likelihood of successful therapy. Additionally, the protection of children
is not significantly furthered by the abrogation of the privilege since the
resulting evidentiary benefit is minor. An alternative approach to the present state of the law should be adopted in which this vital privilege is preserved in all but the most exceptional circumstances and that more fully
synchronizes the need to protect our children with the need to guard the
confidentiality of the therapeutic relationship.

